So Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis of Oaths as Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in America by Milhizer, Eugene R.
So Help Me Allah: An Historical and
Prudential Analysis of Oaths as Applied to the
Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in
Oath Practices in America
EUGENE R. MILHIZER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The administration of justice in American courts depends upon truth.
Witnesses must provide truthful testimony, and those holding certain offices
must perform their official functions with a view toward upholding the truth:
jurors must decide the facts and render verdicts, and judges must apply the
law to particular circumstances, guided by what is true.1 Throughout
American history, courts have attempted to safeguard truth, and thereby
achieve justice, by requiring judges and jurors to take an oath or affirmation
prior to assuming their duties and witnesses before testifying. Following
English and early American customs, the form of oaths in the United States
has traditionally included an explicit reference to God while placing one's
hand on a Bible.2 In light of the growing religious pluralism present in
modem American society, however, the question arises whether to revisit
these customs. In the recent case ACLU of North Carolina v. North
Carolina,3 a Muslim woman contested a judge's refusal to allow her to swear
a witness oath using the Quran.4 This Article considers whether religious
* Acting Dean and Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I would like thank
my research assistants-Matthew Goulding, and especially Anthony Alt and Gregory
LaVoy-for their exceptional work on this Article. Their diligence, enthusiasm, and
wisdom have been indispensible. I would also like to thank my wife, Dianna, for her
great support and help despite disagreeing with my conclusions.
1 Truth is sometimes encumbered by countervailing policy considerations, which are
imposed at trial through mechanisms such as testimonial privileges, exclusionary rules,
and certain evidentiary rules. Likewise, jury nullification might be seen as incompatible
with a juror's duty to decide consistent with factual truth. These exceptions, however,
prove the rule that truth is (or should be) at the heart of the judicial process.
2 See infra Part III.
3 639 S.E.2d 136, 137 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
4 The current North Carolina statute provides that only "Holy Scriptures"--the
Bible-can be used when swearing an oath in a North Carolina court. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 11-2 (2007) ("Judges and other persons who may be empowered to administer
oaths, shall.., require the party to be sworn to lay his hand upon the Holy Scriptures, in
token of his engagement to speak the truth and in further token that, if he should swerve
from the truth, he may be justly deprived of all the blessings of that holy book and made
liable to that vengeance which he has imprecated on his own head."). The substance of
the state statute has existed since 1777. Nadine Farid, Oath and Affirmation in the Court:
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artifacts, such as the Bible and the Quran, should be permitted when taking
an oath in an American court. It concludes that although allowing Christians
to swear on the Bible and Muslims to swear on the Quran is consistent with
the purposes and rationales for oaths generally, such an accommodation is
unnecessary and, on balance, unwise given the competing policy
considerations.
An analysis of religious artifacts and oaths in contemporary America is
especially relevant in light of cases such as A CL U of North Carolina and the
circumstances involving Keith Ellison, America's first Muslim congressman.
Congressman Ellison used the Quran during his swearing-in ceremony while
taking his oath of office prior to assuming duties in the House of
Representatives. 5 Although discussions about the Quran and other religious
artifacts often revolve around the First Amendment,6 a fuller consideration of
the relevant issues extends far beyond questions of constitutional
interpretation. Such an analysis begins by considering the forms,
significance, and meaning of oaths over time and throughout the world-
particularly in American history and in the context of Islam--in order to
better appreciate the roles and purposes of oaths in modem American
society. This Article will concentrate on these fundamental predicate matters
as they relate to witness oaths, leaving constitutional issues7 and an analysis
of other types of oaths8 beyond its scope.
Thoughts on the Power of a Sworn Promise, 40 NEw ENG. L. REv. 555, 558 (2006).
Legislation is now pending to change the statute as follows: "Persons empowered to
administer oaths shall first require the party to be sworn to place the party's hand upon
the Bible or any text sacred to the party's religious faith. If appropriate to the person's
religious faith, the words 'so help me God' may be deleted." 2007 N.C. S.B. 88.
5 See Martha Minow, Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 453,
473 (2007) (describing the details of Congressman Ellison's oath prior to taking office).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....").
7 For a discussion of the constitutionality of only permitting the Bible in oath taking,
see Daniel Blau, Note, Holy Scriptures and Unholy Strictures: Why the Enforcement of a
Religious Orthodoxy in North Carolina Demands a More Refined Establishment Clause
Analysis of Courtroom Oaths, 4 FRST AMEND. L. REv. 223 (2006). While courts have
recognized that using the Bible for oath taking does not violate the Establishment Clause
(see, e.g., Protestants & Other Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. O'Brien,
272 F. Supp. 712, 720-21 (D.D.C. 1967)), a government official cannot force someone to
swear an oath on the Bible. Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir. 1996). For a
discussion of the Free Exercise Clause and the forms of oath taking in courts, see United
States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018-20 (9th Cir. 1992).
8 For example, the use of religious artifacts, such as the Quran, during swearing-in
ceremonies for oaths of office, as was done by Congressman Ellison, is beyond the scope
of this Article. It should be noted, however, that the procedures (as contrasted to the
substance) associated with these types of oaths have an important political component,
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Part II of this Article surveys oaths and oath practices throughout history,
with a particular focus on their development in Western culture. The Part
begins by considering the origin, rationale, and utility of oaths generally as
they evolved over time, as well as describing various oath forms from around
the world. It concludes by comparing the oath practices in Western and non-
Western traditions in order to demonstrate their basic universality.
Part III narrows this historical overview by concentrating on the
development and use of witness oaths in America. It begins as any
comprehensive discussion of American law must-in England-by
examining the influence of the common law tradition and Christianity during
colonial times. It then traces the evolution of American oaths from the
nation's founding to the present day, considering the impact of the unique
American experience, federalism, and federal evidentiary rules on American
oath practices. The Part also reviews contemporary statutes and rules
pertaining to oaths. It concludes by describing the alternative of affirmation,
as it originated in England and was later incorporated into American law.
Part IV continues the historical overview but focuses on Islam and the
sources of moral and legal authority for Muslims. In particular, it explicates
the unique role of the Quran in Islam and its significance to Muslims
generally. It also describes the importance to Muslims of telling the truth and
giving true witness, as well as swearing oaths in light of Islamic law,
particularly in a courtroom setting. Further, it explains that although it is not
essential for Muslims to use the Quran when taking oaths, this practice has
become widely accepted in Islamic culture. The Part concludes by providing
examples of oath taking by Muslims in various political and legal contexts.
Part V applies this historical understanding to present-day America. The
Part affirms the continuing significance, purpose, and relevance of oaths, and
it offers a new definition for oaths based on a modem appreciation of their
essence and purposes. It also addresses the acceptability of permitting
Christians to use the Bible and Muslims to use the Quran while taking a
witness oath in an American court. Part V concludes that such an
accommodation is unnecessary, however, and that the many disadvantages
associated with such a permissive rule would outweigh its limited benefits.
Accordingly, it proposes that the better approach is to allow a non-specific
invocation of God, without the use of any religious artifacts, while offering
witnesses the alternative of an affirmation.
and as such must comport with the rules established by the relevant political body and be
acceptable to the sensibilities of the office holder's electorate.
20091
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
II. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL OATHS
AND THE ARTIFACTS ON WHICH THEY WERE SWORN
In his seminal work on the history of oaths, Professor James Endell Tyler
proposes the following definition: "An oath is an outward pledge given by
the juror that his attestation [or promise] is made under an immediate sense
of his responsibility to God." 9 At its core, therefore, the oath acts as a
guarantor of truth; it guards against testimony that is either false or wavers
from the truth by juxtaposing the individual's dishonest motive against his
sense of moral culpability and fear of divine punishment. While the form and
meaning of oaths vary across societies and have changed over time, the
practice is a "natural and universal custom" that has been found virtually
everywhere human society exists. 10
The universality of oaths can be explained by their close connection to
two dominant aspects of human nature: a natural inclination for truth and a
misdirected self-interest that is sometimes opposed to it. The first of these-a
yearning to discover, relate, and promote the truth---comes from man's
innate desire for knowledge. I I Truth's worth does not depend on man-made
laws or artificial constructs. Rather, its value is transcendent; it is essential to
personal virtue and the common good, and leads toward a "perfection of
understanding." 12 The natural and universal longing for truth and knowledge
9 JAMES ENDELL TYLER, OATHS: THEIR ORIGIN, NATURE, AND HISTORY 15 (1834)
(brackets in original). St. Thomas Aquinas succinctly distinguishes between oaths and
vows or promises: "There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a vow we
direct something to the honour of God, so that for this very reason a vow is an act of
religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of God is taken in
confirmation of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason,
become an act of religion. ... " THOMAs AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Q. 89,
art. 5 (2ded., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1920); see also id., art. 8.
10 Thomas Raebum White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the
Competency of Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373, 378 n.9 (1903).
11 See Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable
Confessions While Respecting Suspects' Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 59-63 (2006).
The Article adopts a realist philosophical position, noting that nature has an order which
both exists and is knowable. Ergo the law itself, which properly seeks to ascertain truth,
has designed systems and practices to promote such discovery. The Article further
deduces that the desire for truth springs from a natural desire for knowledge, and truth is
found at the joining of human intellect and reality, and thus it is determinate.
12 JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 156 (1998).
Professor Finnis continues, "Discussions of the virtue, unless they are guided by
consideration of the underlying norm of practical reason, provide no sufficient indication
whether or not a specific type of act, specifiable in terms which do not presuppose its
rightness or wrongness, is wrong (contrary to virtue), and if wrong generally is also
wrong universally." Id. (emphasis in original).
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is reinforced by other instinctive influences that enhance truth telling:
indolence (it is cognitively easier to tell the truth than not); fear of disgrace (a
rational fear of having one's virtue or honor impugned if caught in a lie); and
religious faith and fear of divine punishment. 13 All of these inclinations help
undergird the cardinal principle that justice requires truth, and thus that
which encourages truth telling must itself be encouraged. 14
Human experience nevertheless demonstrates that truth does not always
prevail over falsity, particularly in the face of venal self-interest. 15 An
egoistic orientation, in which serving oneself may easily (and even
reflexively) replace truth as the guiding principle, breeds distrust of others
and skepticism of what they say. The reality of egoistic self-interest requires
the institution of practical procedures that promote truth, apart from the
internal and natural inclinations and influences that do this.' 6 One such
13 White, supra note 10, at 400-02.
14 See Milhizer, supra note 11, at 63-66. Aquinas states, "as regards the point to be
confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so
that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm
what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgement [sic], a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or
unlawful oath lacks justice." AQUINAS, supra note 9, II-II, Q. 89, art. 3.
15 White, supra note 10, at 373 ("Self-interest is perhaps the fundamental fact in
human nature. Every man naturally seeks to promote the welfare of himself and his
family before that of his neighbor .... [H]e will, if necessary, tell a lie for that purpose.").
Cf John Locke, who, while rejecting self-interest as the basis for natural law, accepts that
self-interest plays a role in the law of nature. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT § 13, at 6 (Tom Crawford ed., Dover Publications 2002) (1689)
[hereinafter, LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE]. For example, Locke contends that if every
individual were given the power of the executive, as in the state of nature before civil
government, "self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the
other side, that ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing
others." Id. Aquinas found that inordinate self-love is the root cause of sin: "[E]very
sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that
anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself
inordinately: for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that
inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin." AQUINAS, supra note 9, II-I, Q. 77, art.
4. Finnis calls Aquinas' description of self-love in a society "egoism," and he explains
that not only can egoism be chosen but such a choice is irrational, "for it treats the basic
reasons for action as if they directed me, not towards a universal human good which
includes my own good as one amongst other instantiations, but rather just towards my
good-as if the principle came specified with a proper name (mine!)." FINNIS, supra note
12, at 111-12.
16 See TYLER, supra note 9, at 6 ("It is because we do not place confidence in the
veracity of men in general, when they profess to speak the truth; it is because we cannot
rely upon their good faith, when they make a bare promise, that we are driven to seek for
something more satisfactory to ourselves, by imposing upon them a more binding
responsibility than that of their mere word.").
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procedure is the oath, which obliges divine punishment if the person
swearing it makes a false statement and thus fails to satisfy his promise to
fulfill his truth-telling obligation. 17
A. The Origin of Oaths: Ancient Oaths and the Practices of Swearing
Them
Oaths are a virtually universal custom, which precede the type of
recorded history that would allow for a complete analysis of their origin. The
evidence of oaths among prehistoric cultures survives today only to the
extent that the custom itself has endured, often through the venerable
practices of primitive tribes. 18 The ancient manner of making an oath
typically involved an individual calling upon a beast or thing of nature (the
sun, a river, etc.) to witness the truth of what was spoken and wreck havoc on
the individual-through consumption or some other form of destruction-if
his words were false. 19 These self-curse customs acted as a guarantor of truth
insofar as the witness believed that a false statement would result in his
imminent peril; as such, the person demanding the pledge would insist on the
oath being sworn in the name of the entity that the witness most feared.20
The earliest recorded oaths are preserved in the texts that comprise the
ancient religious canons known as the Christian Old Testament in the Bible
or the Jewish Tanakh. The Old Testament description of a conversation
between Abraham and King Sodom2l recalls the first oath made to the God
17 Criminal sanctions for perjury use temporal punishment to promote the truth. See,
e.g., WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 574-602 (15th ed. 1996) (also commenting on the
role and necessity of an oath in proving perjury). The deterrent effect of man-made
sanctions, as with divine sanctions, depends on the individual. Additionally, one might
reason that perjury sanctions become more important when the fear of divine sanctions
becomes less significant or controlling. It is safe to say, however, that external sanctions
are not a zero-sum game, and that although the strength of deterrence of one kind or
another will vary by individual and society, external deterrents play an important role in
procuring truth.
18 White, supra note 10, at 374.
19 Id. For example, Professor White notes that the Siberian tribe of Ostyaks would
bring a wild boar's head to court when a tribal member wished to make an oath, imitate
the actions of a boar eating, and call upon boars in general to consume the witness if he
spoke falsely. Id.
20 Id. at 374-75.
21 Genesis 14:22-23 (Catholic Study Bible). After prompting by the king to take a
share of the spoils of a defeated enemy, Abraham replies, "I have sworn to the LORD,
God Most High, the creator of heaven and earth, that I would not take so much as a
thread or a sandal strap from anything that is yours, lest you should say, 'I made Abram
rich."' Id.
[Vol. 70:1
SO HELP ME ALLAH
of the Christians and Jews, and it is likely the oldest recorded example of an
oath.22 In the story, Abraham refuses the king's instruction to avoid
contravening a vow he previously swore to God. Some translations of the
event describe Abraham as raising his hand to God, a solemn practice of
invoking the supernatural that spans from biblical times to the present day.
23
This ancient account, as well as many of the early examples of oaths
discussed later, demonstrates that by the time of Abraham (circa 2000 BC) 24
the practice of swearing oaths and accompanying customs, such as raising
one's hand toward heaven, were widely used and understood by at least two
different cultures. The invocation of a deity is another milestone in the
development of early oaths, as the replacement of natural things with
22 TYLER, supra note 9, at 96-97 (explaining that the earliest oaths on record are
preserved in the form of the Holy Scriptures, naming this passage-Genesis: 14:22-as
the first example of an oath in the Old Testament). But see White, supra note 10, at 376,
who references Genesis 21:22-24 as the earliest satisfactory record of an oath in the Old
Testament, evidently discounting Tyler's choice of Genesis 14, seven chapters earlier,
even though Tyler is repeatedly cited as a preeminent authority throughout White's
article. In Genesis 21:22-24, Abimelech is quoted as saying, "God is with you in
everything you do. Therefore, swear to me by God at this place that you will not deal
falsely with me or with my progeny and posterity ... " to which Abraham responds, "I
so swear." (Catholic Study Bible). Cf also 1 RABBI SHLOMO YITZHAQI [Rashi], THE
METSUDAH CHUMASH/RAsHI 88 (Avrohom Davis & Avrohom Kleinkaufman trans.,
1991), who cites the Talmud (Shavous 36(a)), which relates to the Biblical account of
Noah, as the first recorded oath: "When the LORD smelled the sweet odor, he said to
himself: 'Never again will I doom the earth because of man, since the desires of man's
heart are evil from the start; nor will I ever again strike down all living beings, as I have
done."' Genesis 8:21 (Catholic Study Bible). As Rashi explains, the repetition of the
words "never/ever again" serves as a recorded oath made by God. YrrZHAQI, supra note
22. These examples present three viewpoints as to what is the earliest oath recorded in
Genesis. According to Rashi, God's proclamation may qualify as an oath, depending on
one's definition of the term, even though oaths generally presuppose that a human swears
and invokes God as the witness, rather than God making the oath. In Tyler's choice, a
human explains why he cannot break a previously-made oath to God, which he describes.
Finally, White's selection presents an occasion likely typical of ancient oath-swearing
where one person compels another to make an oath to an entity that the latter finds
binding-in this case Abraham's God, in whom Abimelech likely did not believe-
although there is little ceremony beyond the act of swearing. Regardless of which account
is accepted as the best first record of an oath, they all confirm that the Old Testament of
the Bible, and in particular the book of Genesis, contains the best first account of a
recorded oath; chronologically, however, choosing Rashi's account of Genesis 14 would
move the date back considerably from the time of Abraham to that of Noah.
23 See TYLER, supra note 9, at 97.
24 4 BERNHARD W. ANDERSON, UNDERSTANDING THE OLD TESTAMENT 7 (1998)
(although Genesis was not written by Moses until circa 1300 BC).
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supernatural entities allowed oaths to evolve compatibly with monotheistic
traditions. 25
As the above-described examples suggest, oath taking is ubiquitous
throughout the scriptures and ancient Jewish culture.26 In pre-Christian
Israel, as in many societies prior to the rise of the ordeal of trials, accusations
against one's "neighbor" could be made on one's word, and sometimes the
court's judgment could hinge upon testimony given under oath. This latter
practice is sometimes called a "decisory oath," best described as an oath
taken by a party under certain prescribed conditions-for example, if a bailee
is accused of theft, the item cannot be found, and witnesses do not exist-
which may result in a decision on the case.27 A decisory oath thus constitutes
direct and additional evidence in a proceeding, rather than serving as a
guarantor of witness credibility. Indeed, Jewish law did not even provide for
the swearing of witnesses in criminal cases. 28 As will be shown later in this
25 See Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331-33 (1959). Discussing
the utility of the oath in monotheistic religions, Aquinas observes, "Now nothing is
confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in the very fact
that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His
unfailing truth and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to
God." AQUINAS, supra note 9, II, Q. 89, art. 4.
26 Although not relating directly to oaths, among the most important of all scriptural
passages concerning the obligation to tell the truth is found in the Ten Commandments,
Exodus 20:1-17, which contains an unequivocal prohibition on bearing false witness: the
Eighth Commandment states, "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor."
Exodus 20:16 (Catholic Study Bible). This prohibition, of course, involves the concept of
truth-telling and a natural law perspective on truth, as well as ancient conceptions of
trials. The prohibition expresses absolute law, i.e., law that has no exceptions; it is a
commandment asserting that it is always wrong to lie. See also AQUINAS, supra note 9,
II-II, Q. 110, art. 3; FINNIS, supra note 12, at 154-63 (expounding on the concept that
lying is always wrong). For other examples of Old Testament oaths, see, for example,
Genesis 21:23-24, Joshua 2:12, 23:7, 1 Samuel 30:15, 2 Samuel 19:8, 1 Kings 2:42,
Psalms 63:12, Jeremiah 12:16, Amos 8:14, Zephaniah 1:5 (Catholic Study Bible). See
also Ecclesiastes 5:3-4 (Catholic Study Bible) ("When you make a vow to God, delay
not its fulfillment. For God has no pleasure in fools; fulfill what you have vowed. You
had better not make a vow than make it and not fulfill it.").
27 Silving, supra note 25, at 1333, 1338-39; White, supra note 10, at 384. See, e.g.,
Exodus 22:9-10 (Catholic Study Bible) ("When a man gives an ass, or an ox, or a sheep,
or any other animal to another for safe-keeping, if it dies, or is maimed or snatched away,
without anyone witnessing the fact, the custodian shall swear by the LORD that he did not
lay hands on his neighbor's property; the owner must accept the oath, and no restitution is
to be made.").
28 White, supra note 10, at 384. Rather than being sworn to tell the truth, witnesses
were "cautioned and warned of the sin of lying and were rigidly cross-examined, but no
oath had to be taken." Id. at 384. Reminding the witness of the sin of lying and
particularly bearing false witness was judged sufficient to deter false testimony, even
(Vol. 70:1
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Article, decisory oaths were not unique among the Jews, but were found as
well in Babylonian, 29 Roman, and Muslim practices.
The Old Testament describes the use of other outward signs for making
oaths. These include placing hands on an object or person or shaking hands
to signify the swearing of a solemn oath to God followed by a spoken
response of "Amen, Amen" after a magistrate has repeated the words of an
oath.30 The Jews accorded a greater importance to the swearing of a judicial
oath, which was done in the name of Jehovah, as contrasted to "ordinary"
oaths, which invoked other religious entities such as Jerusalem, heaven, or
the temple. 3'
Similar to the practices of the Jewish monotheistic society, the oaths of
nearly every ancient culture are characterized by a superstitious reverence for
their deities. It was widely believed that a god, when called upon, would
witness the truth of the speaker's statement and, if the speaker spoke falsely,
would smite him. 32 These ancient oaths thus reinforced and heightened a
natural duty to tell the truth by invoking supernatural retribution if the duty
was breached. In other words, divine punishment was feared as a
consequence of taking false oaths, and not necessarily as a result of lying. 33
where the fate of an innocnt man facing a criminal conviction stood precariously in the
balance. "In civil cases, however, witnesses appear to have been sworn." Id. at 384-85.
29 See generally THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON (Robert Francis
Harper trans., 1904). For example, if a merchant gives money to an agent he shall return
the principal to the merchant, but if "when he goes on a journey, an enemy rob him of
whatever he was carrying, the agent shall take an oath in the name of god and go free."
Id. at §§ 102-03. Several provisions of the recovered Code refer to instances where
witnesses must give their testimony "in the presence of god" or otherwise swear an oath
to god to attain relief or remove responsibility. See id. at §§ 9, 23, 103, 106, 107, 120,
126, 131, 249, 266. In other instances a person must swear to another to remove
responsibility. See id. at §§ 20, 206, 207, 227. These laws, rediscovered in 1901, were
promulgated during the time of their namesake, who ruled from circa 1792-1750 BC, and
thus constitute the earliest known legal code that has survived in a virtually complete
form. WILLIAM SEAGLE, MEN OF LAW: FROM HAMMURABI TO HOLMES 16 (1947). For an
account of the many oaths that existed in various Middle Eastern legal systems, see
generally A HISTORY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW (Raymond Westbrook ed., 2003).
30 TYLER, supra note 9, at 103-08.
31 Id. at 113.
32 White, supra note 10, at 381 n. 11 (noting also an interesting dichotomy of utility
for these oaths: such beliefs of immediate divine intervention and punishment were "soon
abandoned" by the educated classes, but as long as the individual taking the oath believed
severe punishment was pending should he speak falsely, the purpose of the oath-
ensuring truthful testimony-remained intact).
33 Id. at 382. Professor White explains, "The exact truth of these observations may
be clearly seen from two well-known facts in history: (1) The great sacrifices which the
ancients would make to avoid breaking their oaths; (2) The utter disregard for honor or
2009]
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The oaths of ancient Greece are characterized by idolatry of their deities,
leaders, and heroes, and they were popularized by legendary poets, authors,
and philosophers. The word "orkos" expresses the ancient Greek
understanding of both the word for "oath" and the "object by which one
swears." 34 As a mark of their importance in Greek jurisprudence,
"[e]videntiary oaths were outside the competence of Athenian law" because
they "remained under the direct control of the gods. '35 To invoke a deity
when taking an oath in ancient Greece, a person would lay his hand upon the
altar while swearing on the honor of that god. 36 This practice was one of the
most widespread and well-documented methods of swearing on a religious
artifact in the ancient world, and indeed may be representative of the
custom's broader usage. 37 It likewise remained highly acceptable and solemn
to swear by the sword, the souls of the departed, and the river Styx, 3 8 with
the list of suitable artifacts proliferating over time to the point of frivolity. 39
truth which they exhibited when by some technicality they had been excused, as they
imagined, from the performance of an oath." Id. at 382 n. 12. St. Augustine, commenting
on the Trojan forefathers of Rome, observed that ancient pagan forms of oaths did not
necessarily produce a truthful or honorable result: "For it seems that the ancient practice
of taking oaths has been preserved even in the midst of the greatest corruption, not for the
sake of restraining wickedness by religious fear, but to complete the tale of crimes by
adding that of pejury." SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 75 (Marcus Dods trans.,
Modem Library 1993).
34 MATTHEw A. PAULEY, I Do SOLEMNLY SwEAR: THE PRESIDENT'S
CONSTITTIONAL OATH: ITS MEANING AND IMPORTANCE IN THE HISTORY OF OATHS, 43-
44 (1999) (referencing H.G. LIDDELL & R. ScoTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON (8th ed.
New York, American Book 1882)). Zeus, the chief god, was the orkos for men, while the
river Styx-the river separating the world of the living from the world of the dead-
served as the orkos for the gods themselves. Id. at 44.
35 S.C. TODD, THE SHAPE OF ATHENIAN LAW 310 (1993).
36 TYLER, supra note 9, at 116-18.
37 Id. at 118-19. Although there is contradictory evidence from sources as
prominent as Cicero and Juvenal as to whether the practice was widespread in ancient
Rome, the evidence that the practice existed outside of Greece is not in doubt. Id. Livy
notes, for example, that Hannibal (of Carthage, now northern Africa) swore upon sacred
things that he would soon be Rome's enemy. Id. at 119.
38 Id. at 123-26.
39 See id. at 121-23 (noting that those who ultimately swore oaths by "whatever
chanced to strike the mind of the individual" were drawn to that self-interested desire to
be believed while knowingly speaking falsely). One might suppose that the likelihood of
false swearing increases as the artifact used is more profane and remote to the oath taker,
and the divine nature of the punisher and punishment diminishes. Again, such an
understanding is based on the subjective nature of an oath taker's conscience. A
permissive use of artifacts undoubtedly contaminated the ordeal of oaths outside of
Greece, and this may account for the later standardization of oaths and oath artifacts, and
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The oath attained special significance in judicial proceedings, however, as
judges, jurors, and witnesses rendered verdicts or provided evidence while
under oath, appealing to the god "Oath" (again "Orkos" in Greek) to ensure
the truth of their statements. 40
In ancient Rome, a society noted for the power and importance of the
state and fidelity to the law, swearing by the emperor and the Roman gods
was a common practice.41 As Montesquieu notes, nothing else bound the
Romans more strongly to their laws.42 And so, someone who was struck by
lightning was denied a traditional burial because "such death was regarded as
Zeus' normal punishment of perjurers."43 The decisory oath appeared again
in Roman judicial proceedings; rather than adding weight to the veracity of
one's statement, a judge or litigant could call on a party to make a decisory
the discriminatory treatment of atheists and other groups, as will be discussed later. See
infra Part III.
40 JOSEPH PLESCIA, THE OATH AND PERJURY IN ANCIENT GREECE 33 (1970);
PAULEY, supra note 34, at 45.
41 TYLER, supra note 9, at 129-32; see also JAMES MuUIEAD, LAW OF ROME, 50
(2d ed. 1985) (noting some of the ancient authorities, including Cicero and Dionysus,
discussed the potency of the Roman oath, and that the altar of Hercules was a common
destination of those who wished to bind another by oath). Important Latin terms include
jusjurandum (oath), votum (a vow made to a deity), and promissum and promitto
(promise, which can serve like an oath when made in the name of a god). See PAULEY,
supra note 34, at 53-54. Also prevalent in ancient Rome and Greece were the practices of
slaying an animal (representing future death if a falsehood was spoken), and swearing a
multiplicity of oaths for the same purpose (to secure additional veracity in the truth of the
statement). TYLER, supra note 9, at 127, 134.
42 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 88
(Thomas Nugent trans., 6th ed. 1793) (1748) (noting the virtue of the Romans in
particular, and the effect that the oath had on virtuous people in general: "Such was the
influence of an oath among those people, that nothing bound them stronger to the laws.
They often did more for the observance of an oath, than they would ever have performed
for the thirst of glory or for the love of their country."). This sentiment is echoed by
Augustine in the story of Marcus Atilius Regulus, a Roman general. During the first
Punic war, Regulus was captured by enemy Carthaginians and sent back to Rome to
advocate for a prisoner exchange. Before Regulus departed, however, he was first bound
"with an oath, that if he failed to accomplish their wish, he would return to Carthage."
AUGUSTINE, supra note 33, at 19. Upon his return to Rome, Regulus advocated on behalf
of the opposite position believing it to be better for the Roman state, and then voluntarily
returned to "his bitterest enemies" where "because he refused to act in violation of the
oath he had sworn by them, was tortured and put to death by a new, and hitherto unheard
of, and all too horrible kind of punishment." Id. at 19-20. The supreme importance of an
oath was famously demonstrated more than a millennium later in Sixteenth Century
England, when Saint Thomas More submitted to being executed rather than swearing a
false oath. See generally ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1960) (recounting the
life and times of Saint Thomas More).
43 Silving, supra note 25, at 1335.
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oath as an alternative to evidence. 44 Just as Greco-Roman culture has
strongly influenced the Western world generally, so too have Greco-Roman
practices pertaining to oaths, along with Jewish customs, informed and
influenced the Christian tradition of oath swearing.
The rise of Christianity as a dominant social force led to the widespread
incorporation of Christian traditions in Western civilization, and this
influence is perhaps most obvious in the practices surrounding. oaths.45 Once
44 White, supra note 10, at 385.
45 Early Christians were actually reluctant to swear oaths due to the prohibition on
swearing issued by Jesus Christ in his Sermon on the Mount:
Again you have heard that it was said to your ancestors, "Do not take a false oath,
but make good to the Lord all that you vow." But I say to you, do not swear at all;
not by heaven, for it is God's throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; nor by
Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. Do not swear by your head, for you
cannot make a single hair white or black. Let your "Yes" mean "Yes" and your
"No" mean "No." Anything more is from the evil one.
Matthew 5:33-37 (Catholic Study Bible).
The interpretation of the Catholic Church, which has been largely followed by all but
a few Christian sects, has understood Jesus' proclamation as not forbidding all oaths.
Following the tradition of St. Paul, see, e.g., 2 Corinthians 1:23 and Galatians 1:20, the
tradition of the Church does not exclude oaths made for "grave and right reasons (for
example, in court)," but it does require a refusal to swear an oath when done for "trivial
matters," when an "illegitimate civil authority" requires it, or when it is required for
"purposes contrary to the dignity of persons or to ecclesial communion." CATECHISM OF
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2154-55 (Doubleday 2d ed. 2003); see also SAINT
AUGUSTINE, ANCIENT CHRISTIAN WRITERS: THE LORD'S SERMON ON THE MOUNT 61
(John Jepson trans., Paulist Press 1978):
[Tihe Lord's command not to swear was given that a person might not run into
using oaths as something good, and by his readiness to swear because of the
habit, lapse into false swearing. Wherefore let one who realizes that swearing is
to be accounted not among the better things but the necessary ones, refrain, as
much as possible, from resorting to it; necessity alone should be the exception,
when he sees persons reluctant to believe something which they would do well
to believe, unless they are convinced by an oath.
AQUINAS, supra note 9, Il-Il, Q. 89, art. 2:
[I]t must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is
proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes
its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring
truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and from its end,
since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to
controversy (Heb. vi. 16). Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that
makes evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution.
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Christianity was proclaimed the official religion of the Empire in 395,
Christian authority filled the void left by abandoned pagan practices
including oath swearing, which would thereafter be cloaked with greater
solemnity than in earlier Greek or Roman societies.46 The first Christian
oaths invoked "[t]he truth to witness," which amounted to a direct appeal to
God, who is "The Truth."'47 Mixing religion and state-which had certainly
occurred by the time of Constantine, the first Christian emperor of Rome-
Roman judicial proceedings required witnesses to take testimonial oaths,48
with a juror laying his hand on the Gospels while lying on an altar.49 These
practices were received into the Code of Justinian,50 which with Roman and
Historically, while the early Christian rule was to not swear at all, or at least only on
the most solemn occasions, Christians eventually took up the practice as they mingled
more openly with their pagan neighbors and "departed further from their original
principles." TYLER, supra note 9, at 149-50. Divisions over the interpretation of Christ's
words, however, will become particularly important in developing the practice of
affirmation, discussed later in Part III.C.
46 PAULEY, supra note 34, at 64.
47 TYLER, supra note 9, at 150
48 Silving, supra note 25, at 1337, 1339.
49 TYLER, supra note 9, at 152, 158-59 (As would need be, the "altar was always
ready in the courts of justice, and the relics were forthcoming at the order of the judge.").
5 0 See, e.g., ANNOTATED JUSTINIAN CODE (Timothy Kearly ed., Fred Blume trans.,
2008), available at http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/blume&justinian/default.asp. The
Christian emperor worked throughout his long reign (527-565) to collect and promulgate
definitive Roman jurisprudence, which ultimately included four parts: the Codex, the
Digest, the Institutes, and the Novellae, which were collectively known as the Corpus
Juris Civilis (Body of Civil Law). This work established a "normative form for the courts
of the major cities and the law schools." FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUs: A SOURCEBOOK IN
CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 189 (Oliver O'Donovan & Joan Lockwood O'Donovan
eds., 1999). As Justinian writes in the Codex:
It is well known that ancient jurists did not regard the judges' vote as valid unless
preceded by an oath that they would give judgment wholly in accordance with the
truth and the law. Since, then, we have found that we must take a well-trodden road,
and since our previously promulgated laws about oaths have given decisive proof of
their value to litigants and earned a general approbation, we have reached the point
of sanctioning this law, which is to have perpetual validity.., and, universally, all
judges whatsoever who administer Roman law; shall not permit the hearing of a
process to begin unless there is a copy of the Holy Scriptures placed before the
judicial bench.... This judicial oath shall be known to all and shall be added by us
as a valuable addition to the laws of Rome and observed by all judges ....
[Counsel who appear shall also] give an oath on the Gospels that they shall deploy
their skill and render all their service to enter on their clients' behalf what they think
to be right and true, omitting no possible effort...
Id. at 193.
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canon law served as the basis for incorporation into the wider Western
tradition. 5'
Adopting the pagan custom of using physical items in making an oath,
artifacts were employed by early Christians in all manner of proceedings.
Common Christian artifacts included the altar, cases containing the
consecrated host, the relics or tombs of a saint, the cross, and mass books.52
The souls or limbs of the departed, and the souls of the saints, were also
sometimes used.53
With the rise and dominance of Christianity came increasing
standardization in oath practices, which notably included using the Bible.
While it is true that early Christian practices often hastily appropriated pagan
rituals, the custom of swearing on the Bible is also rooted in earlier Jewish
practices and in scripture. 54 Christians and Jews alike understood the Bible to
be the inspired word of God, and so its use compelled a believer to be
absolutely truthful in order to avoid swearing falsely by God's name. As
Tyler instructs, "[a]ncient writers tell us that Christians borrowed this
practice [of swearing on the Gospels] from the Jews, who were accustomed
to swear laying their hand upon the book of the Law, regarding that as the
only binding oath.' '55 As the written book of the Law was for the Jews before
In discussing rules governing witnesses, the Code similarly comments on the
widespread use of oaths as one of the tools for enhancing and ensuring credibility: "We
have long since directed that witnesses, before they give their testimony, must be put
under the sanctity of an oath." ANNOTATED JUSTINIAN CODE, supra note 50, at 4.20.9.
Justinian elsewhere comments about the continued use of decisory oaths. See THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 4.6.11 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 1883) ("[I]f any one,
when called upon by his adversary, makes oath that the debt which he sues for is due and
unpaid, the praetor most justly grants him an action, in which the inquiry is not whether
the debt is due, but whether the oath has been made."). Justinian also notes how both
sides to an action must swear oaths that they were perpetrating neither frivolous lawsuits
nor frivolous defenses, and that damages and costs could be assigned against those who
brought "reckless" cases. See id. at 4.16 and 4.16.1 ("[T]he authors and preservers of our
law have always sought most anxiously to hinder men from engaging too recklessly in
law-suits, and it is what we ourselves desire also. And the best method of succeeding in it
is ... sometimes by the sacred tie of an oath.... [Also,] under our constitution, an oath is
administered to all defendants. For the defendant is not admitted to state his defence until
he has sworn that it is from a persuasion of the goodness of his own cause.").
51 Silving, supra note 25, at 1336.
52 TYLER, supra note 9, at 119, 126, 136. In making their oaths, Christians not only
swore to God, but also to the angels and archangels, the saints, and the pope. Id. at 136.
53 Id. at 121-22, 126.
54 See Leviticus 19:11-12 (Catholic Study Bible) ("You shall not lie or speak falsely
to one another. You shall not swear falsely by my name, thus profaning the name of your
God. I am the LORD.").
55 TYLER, supra note 9, at 151.
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them, the Gospels were sacred to Christians and swearing upon them soon
became the dominant practice in Christendom. Indeed, as time passed,
written history scarcely mentions Christian oath ceremonies that did not
involve swearing upon the Gospels, relics, an altar, or a cross, with physical
punishment or excommunication being threatened for anyone who swore
outside of the permitted forms.56 The dominance of Christianity in the West
led to the mainstreaming of rituals including oaths customs, which insulated
them from secular interference and allowed for their further refinement
irrespective of ephemeral civil authorities.
B. Oaths Outside of the Western Tradition
Although the pedigree of American oaths is undoubtedly tied most
strongly to Western and Judeo-Christian traditions, it is also worthwhile to
consider exotic oath practices, for they can provide further insight and
context. 57 As non-native religions, particularly Christianity and Islam, spread
across Asia, Africa, and South America, indigenous oath forms were
adopted, modified and subsumed. Many native oath modalities have
nevertheless survived and are still used throughout the world today.
The contemporary oath practices of some African tribes mirror ancient
rituals. Among the simplest forms, two litigants would seize an animal (a dog
or fowl), hold it by its ends, and cut it in two with a machete, which was the
fate awaiting any party who should swear falsely. 58 The shafa, a wrapping of
sacred objects by specifically-chosen foliage, is commonly used by many
African tribes as an oath taking artifact, such as by touching the shafa (to
5 6 Id. at 158.
57 1 seek here not to catalog each oath that has been discovered or analyzed by
historians and anthropologists, but rather to provide a sampling of oaths outside of the
Western tradition. This brief overview will not discuss Islamic oaths and beliefs, which is
reserved for a more in-depth discussion in Part IV. It is important initially to emphasize
the universality and ubiquity of oaths, as this Part can describe only some of the many
cultures that utilize(d) distinct oath traditions. In her research, Professor Silving accounts
for only three legal systems which never used or largely abolished oaths: Slavic culture,
contemporary Swiss law, and Chinese law. Silving, supra note 25, at 1375-81. Her
conclusions are dubious given the well-documented examples of "Chinese oaths" in
American courts and elsewhere. Consider also John M. Roberts' ethnographical survey of
oaths, which catalogs the vast array of cultures and societies, particularly those of non-
Western heritage, that utilize(d) oaths in their legal systems. See John M. Roberts, Oaths,
Autonomic Ordeals, and Power, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 186, 189-205 (1965). Suffice
it to say, there exist few if any examples of legal systems that did not or do not utilize
some form of oath.
58 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, On Swearing. An Account of Some Judicial Oaths in
Northern Nigeria, 25 AFR.: J. INT'L AFR. INST. 43, 44 (1955) (as practiced by the Naga of
Assam).
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mark the solemnity), spilling animal's blood on it, or incanting the shafa to
seize a liar.59 Oaths are also sworn on nature: for example, the River Rhum
for the Kopri; the Kamale mountain peak; or a marsh inhabited by the spirit
Guti, which oath takers must traverse in the Guti ordeal. 60 In the absence of a
designated artifact, most pagan tribes swear on a steel object, such as a spear
or knife.61 Many older African oath practices were mainstreamed as tribes
increasingly interacted with each other, and as modem nation-states assumed
a more direct and pervasive role in civil affairs. 62
Many of the same themes are evident in Asian countries. For example,
traditional Chinese oaths involve breaking a saucer; writing sacred characters
on paper and setting it afire (signifying that the witness will too bum if his
oath is false); ceremonially burning straw; and cutting off a chicken's head,
also known as the "Chinese chicken oath," which appears to be among the
most significant of Chinese oaths. 63 For Hindus, oaths often involved "the
witness drinking holy water from the Ganges, and eating of the leaves of a
sacred plant, the water and the leaves being both administered by a Brahmin"
or on their holy books, the Shasters. 64 In Samoa, the mixture of divinely-
blessed artifacts, immediate retribution, and swearing produced a common
59 Id. at 45-49.
6 0 Id. at 45-46, 48 (explaining that for the Marghi, the Guti ordeal represents the
most solemn form of an oath, so feared that litigants have been known to confess to
perjury rather than undergo it). Common among African tribes are oaths connected to
trials by ordeal, which of course were also found throughout Western history, a thorough
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. One example of such (that also
provides an interesting anthropological glance into African culture) is the sasswood (or
red water) ordeal, an extreme and often gruesome form ofjudicial oath outlawed in many
places by government. The accused enters a circle of people with pots of liquid at the
center. He invokes the name of God three times, asks for God's wrath if he is guilty, and
drinks water that is so toxic that it reduces respiratory functions until breathing ceases. If
the accused becomes nauseated, he is proclaimed innocent. If he loses self-control, he is
proclaimed guilty and his body is cursed, stoned, often dragged, and repeatedly
"lacerated" until death. If the accused escapes without injury, however, he is thought pure
and his accusers are arraigned in the same ordeal. This ordeal was seldom administered in
a fair manner. Id. at 51-52 (relying on J.L. WILSON, WESTERN AFRICA: ITS HISTORY,
CONDITIONS, AND PROSPECTS 210-32 (1856)).
61 Kirk-Greene, supra note 58, at 44-45.
62 For a more contemporary discussion of the role of oaths in a "developed" African
society, see Philip Durand, Customary Oathing and the Legal Process in Kenya, 14 J.
AFR. L. 17 (1970).
63 TYLER, supra note 9, at 165.
64 Id. at 166 (noting also that different methods could be prescribed depending on
one's caste, although such practices may have been muddled when imperial British
judges instituted reforms). Other Indian oaths used more traditional methods of swearing
on animals, such as the tiger or elephant, and the tail of a (sacred) cow. Id. at 168-69.
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oath whereby the accused would lay his hand on the village's sacred stone,
declaring "If I stole the thing, may I speedily die."'65
Oaths were also used in ancient South and Latin American cultures. In
Aztec society, which was renowned for its profound reverence for deities and
societal organization, the speaker avowed to tell the truth by touching his
finger to the ground and then his tongue while invoking the Sun and Earth
deities. 66 Beyond their common function as a verifier of truth, witness oaths
in highly developed and formal legal proceedings were widely employed
prior to the Spanish Conquest, with death being the sole punishment for
perjury.67
The forms of oaths permitted in American courtrooms provide another
interesting window into non-Western cultures. From China comes the
"chicken oath," 68 "joss-stick burning" (whereby one takes a joss-stick in his
hand and swears upon it),69 and blowing out a candle signifying that if a
witness lied he too would be "snuffed out."'70 A Japanese witness was
allowed to swear an oath consistent with his non-Christian religious beliefs.71
And, from Nigeria comes the practice of swearing on the tribal icon
Akolmologoba, who would destroy a liar within seventy-seven days after
65 Kirk-Greene, supra note 58, at 44.
66 Zelia Nuttall, Ancient Mexican Superstitions, 10 J. AM. FOLKLORE 265, 271
(1897) (noting that this practice, although odd to Spanish citizens who observed it, was
said to be a "safe and reliable test of the truth" of the assertion made). Tyler recalls
precisely the same oath from a separate correspondence, thus providing additional weight
that this is not only an authoritative account of this oath, but also that this oath was in
wide and prominent use in Mexican society. See TYLER, supra note 9, at 173-74.
67 R.B. Gaither, Government and Jurisprudence of the Mexicans Before the Spanish
Conquest, 6 VA. L. REV. 422, 428, 433-34 (1920).
68 Goon Bow v. People, 43 N.E. 593, 594 (Ill. 1896) (permitting Chinese witnesses
to swear the Chinese chicken oath in addition to the regular oath after statements by
defense counsel that it was the only way to ensure truthful testimony from the witnesses).
69 State v. Chyo Chiagk, 4 S.W. 704, 708-09 (Mo. 1887) (holding that where the
statute permits every witness be sworn in the manner most binding on his conscience and
every non-Christian shall be sworn in the method prescribed by their religion, it was an
error to compel a Chinese interpreter to be sworn in the usual way when he states that the
"joss-stick burning is the true oath among the Chinese").
70 State v. Gin Pon, 47 P. 961, 962-63 (Wash. 1897) (permitting oath taking
performed pursuant "to the custom and religion of their country").
71 Patrik Jonsson, Raise Your Right Hand And Swear To Tell The Truth... On The
Koran?, CHRIsTIAN Sci. MONITOR, July 20, 2005, at 2 ("Mochitura Hashimoto, the
Japanese submarine commander who testified in the court martial of a US Navy captain
in 1945, was allowed by a military tribunal to swear on his beliefs of Shinto, the ancient
religion of Japan.").
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taking a false oath. 72 In times past, some American courts seemed especially
receptive to such exotic oath practices, perhaps because the importance of the
religious aspects of oaths and the influence of common law rules that
allowed for a broad accommodation of diverse oath forms. 73
As this historical survey demonstrates, oaths have evolved over time and
across cultures to promote and safeguard man's universal desire for the truth.
And, as is evident from the earliest biblical accounts to reports of African
tribal ceremonies, disparate cultures have developed diverse oath forms, with
a common purpose of tempering egoistic self-interest and other base
motivations that undermine the truth, in order to better achieve justice.
Although the ceremonial modalities may vary, a divine invocation has
emerged as among the most common and effective approaches for obtaining
the truth. And, regardless of whether the religion is centered upon nature,
pagan rituals, or highly developed and enduring monotheistic traditions like
Judaism and Christianity, its artifacts are often employed to facilitate truthful
testimony.
As time passed and societies "developed," their legal oath practices
became more formalized, standardized, and secularized. 74 Simultaneously, as
tensions grew between pagans and Christians with the Christianization of
Rome, likewise friction increased among religious sects and societies as
some persons were excluded from full participation in legal process and civil
life because their religious beliefs (or lack of belief) disqualified them from
taking oaths. The analysis now shifts to the history of the development of
oaths in the West, with particular emphasis on English common law and
American jurisprudence.
72 Fagbemi v. State, 778 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. App. 1989) (allowing a Nigerian
witness to swear his tribal oath and a standard oath, as well as the standard oath in the
presence of the jury).
73 These common law practices and others will be discussed in greater detail in Part
III. Despite the prevalence of the common law rule and the multitude of religions and
ethnicities present in the American melting pot, however, such practices were not
generally memorialized unless they were litigated on appeal or otherwise discussed in a
published opinion, as these examples were.
74 See Richard S. Willen, Religion and the Law: The Secularization of Testimonial
Procedures, 44 Soc. ANALYSIS 53 (1983) (arguing that the rationalization and continuing
utility of the testimonial oath underscores changes in cultural meaning attached to legal
processes). Willen also recognized that even as change occurred, "[t]raditional oath-
taking as well as related testimonial principles set limits and gave direction to the new
testimonial procedures developed" because society simply does not abandon its
traditional norms in the face of change. Id. at 59.
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III. THE OATH AND AFFIRMATION IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND CONTEMPORARY PRACTICES
A. The Development and Status of Oaths in England
The English judicial system and its common law tradition have had the
most direct and pervasive influence on American oath practices. After the
fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, no secular
government exercised hegemony in the West. A central ecclesiastical
authority, however, did ascend: the Christian Church. In short order, the
Church rose within this geopolitical context to become the dominant religion
(and power) in the region throughout the Middle Ages. In England,
Christianity expanded through monasticism and missionary work-by,
among others, St. Augustine and St. Patrick-until it superseded local pagan
rituals. 75 The new, pervasive Christian orthodoxy helped impose a rather
narrow view of who could swear oaths and what practices could be used. As
oaths gained status in civil life, they continued to be shaped by Christianity-
to the point of institutionalization in England-until an eighteenth-century
court mandated greater multicultural tolerance with repercussions that
continue to the present day.
The ubiquitous use of judicial oaths for witnesses in the West dates back
to early Germanic law, 76 which itself was heavily influenced by post-Roman
Christianity and the modes for taking oaths that had contemporaneously
developed. 77 Like earlier Jewish decisory oaths, Germanic oaths to the
Christian God helped establish one's claim or case as true, predicated on the
prevailing belief that "such an appeal could not be falsely made with
impunity. '78 The use of decisory oaths continued under early English
common law. 79 The foundational premise for oaths had already begun to
75 See generally HENRY MAYR-HARTING, THE COMING OF CHRISTIANrrY TO ANGLO-
SAxON ENGLAND (3d ed. 1991) (noting in particular that England's tribes had abandoned
paganism by the mid-seventh century, which allowed the Church to continue its ascent
throughout the medieval period).
76 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1815, at 2348 (1904); see also Silving, supra note 25, at 1340-43, 1361.
77 Roman legal thought, as influenced by the Roman Catholic Church, played an
important role in shaping English law as well as the law of continental Europe. The
historical record reflects, for example, the Church's influence in the drafting of the
Magna Carta in 1215. See generally R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune,
66 U. CH. L. REV. 297 (1999) (discussing the origins of the Magna Carta).
78 WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 1815, at 2348; see also Silving, supra note 25, at
1345.
7 9 See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
341-42 (reprint William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1992). Discussing the "wager of law"
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change, however, from the divine-interventionist belief that to swear falsely
would summon (perhaps immediate) supernatural punishment, to an
understanding that an oath's efficacy rested on its capacity to link the
conscience of man to God.80 Reflecting both this development and the
growing standardization of oaths throughout Europe, Emperor Joseph II of
Austria decreed the formula "[s]o verily help me God," which was widely
adopted across the continent. 81 By this time oaths were established as a
routine practice, which was regularly demanded by courts rather than
opposing parties.82 Only much later, when oaths were firmly based on
appeals to conscience rather than fear of divine intervention, and when the
courts became more tolerant of diverse religious beliefs, would their decisory
quality be fully and finally abandoned. Until then, Christians would enjoy a
favored status in the oath taking regime, which was dominated by Christian
beliefs and the use of Christian artifacts.
The earliest English commentators confirm the impact of Christian
influences in oath taking practices-and civil government more generally-
by recognizing both the elevated status of the law in society and the Bible's
influence in shaping the law. 83 Three methods were commonly used to
resolve difficult cases which had "defied other forms of decision or
settlement: ordeal, battle, [and] oath."'84 Although all these modes for
species of trial, Blackstone explains that "our ancestors considered, that there were many
cases where an innocent man, of good credit, might be overbourne by a multitude of false
witnesses; and therefore established this species of trial, by the oath of the defendant
himself: for if he will absolutely swear himself not chargeable, and appears to be a person
of reputation, he shall go free and forever acquitted of the debt, or other cause of action."
Id. Blackstone further observes that decisory oaths had its roots in "the Roman Empire"
and can be traced back-as is done in Part II of this Article-to "Mosaical law." Id. at
342. He also notes, however, that decisiory oaths were not available to defendants
charged with a public crime of "force and violence." Id. at 346.
80 As Greenleaf explains, "[t]he design of the oath is not to call the attention of God
to man; but the attention of man to God - not to call on Him to punish the wrong-doer;
but on man to remember that He will." 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 364, at 504
(16th ed. 1899).
81 Silving, supra note 25, at 1354.
82 Id. at 1341.
8 3 JoHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND
SOCIETY IN ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 2-3 (1996).
84 Id. at 72. The longstanding concept of oath-helpers was particularly common in
the Anglo-Saxon law. Anglo-Saxon oaths of exculpation could be taken by "the party
alone or together with other 'oath-helpers."' Id. at 76. While no case law exists from this
time, the written laws suggest that the "party bearing proof often had to make an
oath ... and that support from others was particularly necessary for men of ill-
repute .... The oath was a re-affirmation of the defendant's original denial, in words such
as 'by the Lord, the oath which N. has swom is clean and unperured' ... [choosing to
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procuring the truth interjected the supernatural into judicial proceedings, the
oath in particular relied on Christian practices insofar as "jurors and
witnesses must be sworn according to the Christian method upon the Holy
Scriptures. '85
Henry of Bracton produced the first comprehensive study of the English
common law in his thirteenth century treatise, On the Laws and Customs of
England. In his opus, Bracton reinforces the importance of oaths by referring
to its three companions: truth, justice, and judgment, assigning the first two
to jurors and the third to judges.86 Bracton describes the oath as providing
"[r]ecourse to a greater council," which he illustrates by referring to "a
certain oath which is tendered by a party to a party in judgment or by a judge
to a party, in which there is no conviction. For it is sufficient for them to wait
for the vengeance of God."'87 Bracton charges jurors, judges, and other
decision-makers to produce just and truthful outcomes, 88 and he offers
swear on behalf of another oftentimes involved protecting one's own interest that risked
exposure, thus] self-interest as well as fear of God might ensure that justice was done in
cases of compurgation." Id. at 76-77; see also 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 72 (reprint William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1976) (1883)
(discussing the relative value of people of different ranks among Anglo-Saxons when
swearing oaths and in ordeals, and thus the "numbers game" which had to be played
when recruiting oath-helpers).
85 White, supra note 10, at 387 (citing 3 HENRY OF BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 197 (Travers Twiss trans., 1880) (n.d.)).
86 3 HENRY OF BRACTON, supra note 85, at 197. In support, Bracton recites a
multitude of early English oath practices. Id.
87 4 id. at 407.
88 Bracton describes the process of swearing jurors thusly: "when the parties have
consented to the jurors, then let the assise proceed, and they ought immediately to swear
in this form, and the first in these words: Hear this, ye justices, that I will declare the truth
of this assise, and of the tenement of which I have made a view under the precept of the
lord the king." 3 id. at 187. He then describes the assises' oath: "'and I will for nothing
omit to say the truth, so may God me help and these hallowed things.' And afterwards let
all the other jurors swear in order, each by himself, and in this manner: 'Such oath as he
our said foreman has swom, I will keep on my part, so help me God and these hallowed
things."' Id. Explaining the procedure in homicide cases, Bracton states that the oath is
necessary
so that the inquisition may be free from all suspicion. Twelve jurors therefore being
present and four townspeople, each of the townspeople or all together, each holding
up his hand, shall swear in these words. Hear this, ye justices, that we will speak the
truth concerning those things, which ye shall require from us on the part of the lord
the king, and for nothing will we omit to speak the truth, so God us help &c....
because there follows accordingly and differently his condemnation or delivery, and
therefore we say to you on the faith in which you are bound to God, and in virtue of
the oath, which you have taken, that you cause us to know the truth thereof, and
omit not from fear, or love, or hatred, but having God only before your eyes, to
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recourse to defendants who are ordered to pay substantial damages by
requiring jurors to swear an oath that their decision was just.89
Although more than 350 years and many important developments in the
law separate Bracton and Lord Edward Coke, no other writer made as
significant or authoritative contributions to the common law as the latter.90
Like commentators who came before him, Coke believed in the supreme
importance of the Christian oath, explaining that a witness is bound "by his
oath, which is so sacred, as he calleth Almighty God (who is truth itself and
cannot be deceived, and hath knowledge of the secrets of the heart) to
witness that which he shall depose."91 Coke forcefully supported the then-
dominant view in English law that a "heathen" was not to be believed and
thus only Christian oaths sworn on the Gospels (to avoid idolatry) should be
accepted in English courts.92 Coke defined the basic question as whether an
declare to us, whether he is guilty of that which is imputed to him, or of other
misdeeds.
2 id. at 457.
89 4 id. at 407 ("[If the jurors have pressed too heavily on the disseysor with
damages... an oath of such kind shall be administered by the judge to the jurors, as if
their finding was dubious or obscure.").
90 See John Marshall Gest, The Writings of Sir Edward Coke, 18 YALE L.J. 504, 506
(1909) ("Coke as a law writer was as far superior in importance and merit to his
predecessors, at least if we except Bracton, as the Elizabethan writers in general were
superior to those whom they succeeded, and, as the great Elizabethans fixed the standard
of our English tongue, so Coke established the common law on its firm foundation.").
Even Coke's most ardent and vocal critics, such as Lord Campbell, praised the technical
merit and overall value of Coke's writing, acknowledging Coke's "full mind" and
"mastery over his subject," which enabled him to compose works that contained "the
whole common law of England as it then existed." Id. at 514.
91 EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND;
CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COuRTs 278 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2d prtg.
2002). The works of Coke and Blackstone, although written in English, do not always use
modem spelling. Some of the original spellings have been changed in this Article to
conform to contemporary usage, e.g. "fwear" to "swear" or "infidell" to "infidel."
92 White, supra note 10, at 387. Jews were the one exception to this rule. See, e.g.,
Robeley v. Langston, (1668) 84 Eng. Rep. 196, 2 KEB. 314 (where because the witnesses
were Jews, the Chief Justice swore them upon the Old Testament). Under the common
law formula, Jews were candidates for exclusion since they could not in good faith swear
upon the Christian New Testament, a proposition which was famously promulgated by
Lord Coke but ultimately rejected by the common law. Recognizing a common heritage
and shared faith in the same God, Jews were allowed to testify as witnesses. This
reasoning was adopted on several occasions, including as a supporting rationale for the
opinion in Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (ICB.) (in differentiating
between "infidels" and Jews even though both were non-Christian, the court explained
"for they [Jews] believe a God, just in the same manner the Christians do; and the Old
Testament is as much the evangelium to them, as the New is to us; and therefore widely
[Vol. 70:1
SO HELP ME ALLAH
"infidel or pagan prince may swear in the case by false gods, seeing he
thereby offends the true God by giving divine worship to false gods;" he
responded that if "a Christian should any way induce another to swear by
them, herein he should grievously sin."'93 Christian exclusivity was a logical
consequence of this thinking, and thus only Christians could serve as jurors
or be sworn as witnesses under early English common law.
Equally as important as who could testify or serve as a juror, the
development of English oath practices helped formalize the prerequisite that
witness testimony must be presented under oath94 to jurors who likewise took
an oath. Sir James Stephen addresses the ex officio witness oath, "by which
persons who took it swore to make true answer to all such questions as
should be demanded of him."' 95 This form was used in the various English
courts but not without criticism. 96 Jurors routinely took oaths that included
the phrase "so help me God and the Saints."' 97 Accordingly, although the
forms of oaths, the rules surrounding them, and even their significance varied
among societies, the institution of the oath and its centrality to the judicial
system had by now become firmly fixed.
different from the infidel, who has no notion of the true God." (A more in-depth
discussion of Omychund will soon follow.)). This distinction was generally recognized
throughout continental Europe, although some countries did require Jews to swear on the
Bible in order to present evidence. TYLER, supra note 9, at 93-95. Professor White later
notes the fallaciousness in arguing that only Christians can be sworn: essentially, a
witness relates evidence under the sanctity of a belief on his part in a superior power, and
thus the witness-regardless of whether he is Christian-is sworn according to his own
subjective religious belief. White, therefore, ascribes this custom to two other culprits: a
judicial system running on the pre-existing practices of using Christian oaths coupled
with a general feeling of Christian superiority over non-Christians. White, supra note 10,
at 389.
93 COKE, supra note 91, at 155 (relying on St. Augustine as authority for his
position).
94 White, supra note 10, at 388-89 (explaining that the oath was thought to be "the
strongest possible guarantee of truth").
95 1 STEPHEN, supra note 84, at 338, 342.
96 Id. at 342. The ex officio oath "was understood to be, and was, used as an oath to
speak the truth on the matters objected against the defendant-an oath, in short to accuse
oneself. It was vehemently contented by those who found themselves pressed by this oath
that it was against the law of God, and the law of nature.... In this, I think, as in most
other discussions of the kind, the real truth was that those who disliked the oath had
usually done the things of which they were accused, and which they regarded as
meritorious actions, though their judges regarded them as crimes." Id. The ex officio oath
was eventually outlawed. See 2 STEPHEN, supra note 84, at 220; see also 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 79, 100-01, 447) (marking a transition in legal theory from harsh rules to
protections against self-incrimination, or, in other words, balancing a desire to expose the
truth against respect for human dignity).
97 White, supra note 10, at 387.
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Omychund v. Barker marks a major change to the common law and
presages modem Western oath practices. 98 Omychund set aside the extant
common law practice, endorsed by Coke, which allowed only Christian oaths
sworn by Christians, so that any believer in a superior being may be sworn
on whatever oath is most binding on his conscience.99 Lord Chief Justice
Willes opined that limiting the oath to Christians "is contrary to religion,
common sense, and common humanity; and I think the devils themselves...
could not have suggested any thing worse." 10 0 Unanimous in their judgment,
the Justices' opinions recognize many of the historical truths about oaths
previously discussed in this Article. In particular, they acknowledge that no
single oath form has been prescribed throughout history, and that oaths were
enhanced by but did not originate with Christianity.10' Accordingly, no
98 Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B.). The history of oaths reflects
their gradual development and melding of oath traditions. Omychund represents perhaps
the one notable exception to this process of incremental change. The Omychund reforms
did not emerge from a desire to correct a perceived injustice but rather as a response to
the practical challenges facing English courts occasioned by greater international (and
thus inter-cultural) trading. At issue in Omychund was whether the Gentoo oath practices
of India should be incorporated into the strictly structured English system, in connection
with a trade lawsuit involving Indian witnesses. As Aquinas once observed, "an oath is
required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of belief in another man."
AQuINAS, supra note 9, II-II, Q. 89, Art. 5. The defect of distrust was perhaps most
evident in the asymmetric relationship between the colonizer and the colonized.
99 Professor Wigmore succinctly captures the essence and logic of the common law
rule:
Such being the essentials of the belief regarded as a security for trustworthiness, it
follows that theform of the administration of the oath is immaterial, provided that it
involves, in the mind of the witness, the bringing to bear of this apprehension of
punishment. The oath's efficacy may depend upon both the general name and nature
of the witness' faith and formula of words or ceremonies which he considers as
binding, i.e. as subjecting him to the risk of punishment. But it cannot matter what
tenets of theological belief or what ecclesiastical organization he adheres to,
provided the above essentials are fulfilled; and it cannot matter what words or
ceremonies are used in imposing the oath, provided he recognizes them as binding
by his belief. Therefore any form suffices which actually binds the particular
witness' conscience, even if it varies from the orthodox form.
WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 1818, at 2352 (emphasis in original).
100 Omychund, 26 Eng. Rep. at 30.
101 Id. at 42, 45, 46 (opinions of Lord Chief Baron, Lord Chief Justice Willes, and
Lord Chief Justice Lee, respectively) (observing "oaths are as old as the creation" and
"universally established"); see also Ramskissenseat v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 13, 13-14
(1739) (an earlier proceeding from the same case, holding that the "general rule is, that
all persons who believe a God, are capable of an oath; and what is universally understood
by an oath, is, that the person who takes it, imprecates the vengeance of God upon him, if
the oath he takes is false").
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specific outward act was deemed essential for a valid oath, "for this was
always a matter of liberty, and several nations have used several rites and
ceremonies in their oaths ... there is but one general rule of evidence, the
best that the nature of the case will admit.'10 2 Finally, because evidence
cannot be admitted without an oath acting as a guarantor of truth, "it would
be absurd for [a non-Christian] to swear according to the Christian oath,
which he does not believe; and therefore, out of necessity, he must be
allowed to swear according to his own notion of an oath."'10 3
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England,
published in 1765, was a singularly important source for understanding the
history and legacy of English oaths after Omychund.104 Although it is hardly
revolutionary with respect to oaths, Blackstone's Commentaries addresses
several topics relating to them, including the manner in which all criminal
witnesses are sworn. The "ancient and commonly-received practice" at the
time of Queens Mary I (1516-1558) and Elizabeth 1 (1533-1603) precluded
defendants from calling witnesses in capital cases, until the courts "grew so
,heartily ashamed of a doctrine so unreasonable and oppressive that a
practice was gradually introduced of examining witnesses for the prisoner,
but not upon oath; the consequences of which still was, that the jury gave less
credit to the prisoner's evidence, than to that produced by the crown." 105 It
was not until the reign of Queen Anne (1665-1714) that "in all cases of
treason and felony, all witnesses for the prisoner should be examined upon
102 Omychund, 26 Eng. Rep. at 33 (opinion of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke)
(emphasis in original).
103 Id. at 31 (opinion of Lord Chief Justice Willes).
104 Blackstone's Commentaries are widely recognized as being both influential in
England and the preeminent source of English law in early America. See THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 287 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed.
1956) (1929). Justice Scalia has described Blackstone as "the Framers' accepted authority
on English law and the English Constitution." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As future-Chief Justice
Harlan Stone once noted, Blackstone (along with Coke) found the common law system to
be "the perfection of reason"; they would undoubtedly be pleased to learn of their far-
reaching impact, often through Blackstone's Commentaries, on early American legal
philosophy, which looked to the "past as the means, not only of securing a needful
continuity of legal doctrine, but as affording the measure of experience which is to guide
the next step in the development of the law." Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the
United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 11-12 (1936).
105 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 359-60. Blackstone attributes the discrepant
treatment of prosecution and defense witnesses to "ancient" practices. Although the
literature is otherwise silent on this point, one can assume, based on Blackstone's
account, that such distinctions among witnesses were widely recognized, at least among
the progenitors of the English common law.
2009]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
oath, in like manner as the witnesses against him."' 106 These changes reflect
the increasing status and inclusivity of oaths in English (and thus American)
courts.
Although Blackstone, unlike Coke and others before him, provides
scarce examples of the words that composed an oath, he does offer extensive
commentary concerning their usage and purposes. In an Aquinas-like
fashion, Blackstone explains that the "oath administered to the witness is not
only that what he deposes shall be true, but that he shall also depose the
whole truth; so that he is not to conceal any part of what he knows, whether
interrogated particularly to that point or not." 10 7 He also recognizes the
ubiquity of oaths throughout the legal system, for both private and public
wrongs, 10 8 and notes their particular importance in the discovery process. 109
Blackstone also observes, however, that the oath practices in the post-
Omychund England continued to exclude atheists and other non-believers.I 10
106 4 id. at 360 (summarizing the statute that leveled the playing field: Witnesses on
Trial for Treason, etc. Act, 1702, 1 Anne, s. 2, c. 9) (emphasis in original); see also 2
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN § 29, at 434 (1726).
107 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 372; see also Dickson v. Pinch, 11 U.C.C.P.
146, 157 (1861).
108 See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 374 (noting that, although "the oath
of jurors to find according to their evidence was construed to be," they may consider
outside knowledge without offending their oaths); id. at 437 (discussing oaths in courts of
equity as a means by which the court could appeal to the "conscience" of the parties in
order to expose the "truth of the transaction"); id. at 80-83 (describing oaths used in
certain special and private courts that "vary from the course of common law," for
instance, where the "county-clerk and twelve suitors" shall summarily examine the
parties and witnesses while under oath, even though otherwise formal proceedings were
not used); id. at 345 (noting that children under the age of 21 cannot give evidence
because "he cannot be admitted to his oath"); 4 id. at 137-38 (commenting on the
importance of "lawful oath[s]" that were properly administered in prosecuting perjury);
id. at 213 (noting that a rape victim may be admitted as a competent witness when her
evidence is given under oath).
109 See 3 id. at 446-47 (discussing oaths in the discovery process through, especially
in an answer to the plaintiffs complaint); id. at 382 (In his description of an alternate
means of case resolution that does not include a jury's verdict, Blackstone laments that
the "want of a complete discovery by the oath of the parties" is one of the "principal
defects" of this system.).
1103 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at 360-70; Omychund, 26 Eng. Rep. at 31 (As
Lord Chief Justice Willes explained, "[t]hough I have shewn that an Infidel in general
cannot be excluded from being a witness, and though I am of opinion that infidels who
believe a God, and future rewards and punishments in the other world, may be witnesses;
yet I am as clearly of opinion, that if they do not believe a God, or future rewards and
punishments, they ought not to be admitted as witnesses."). As discussed later, this
sentiment continued as the standard for years following Omychund, and it was not put to
rest in America until well into the twentieth century. For example, Rapalje explained that
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These persons were judged to lack the capacity to take an oath because their
invocation of God presumably would have no effect on their consciences.
Thus, while Omychund allowed non-Christian oath practices and traditions in
English (and later American) courtrooms, it adhered to the principle that an
oath must be predicated on a belief in a higher power and a responsibility to
answer to a divine entity should one's oath be false. The juror's oath was
thought to be so indispensable that a refusal to take it would result in a
contempt citation and the imposition of a fine."' This understanding was
imported to America, where it would be retained for decades. Likewise, the
common law practice of allowing a witness to be sworn by whatever means
were most binding on his conscience would be brought to the New World.
B. Oaths in America: From the Founding Fathers to the Federal Rules
English common law was the law of colonial America." 2 With some
modifications, the common law was "assumed by the courts of justice... or
declared by statute" as the law of every original colonial state, and it was
specifically adopted as "one entire system" by Massachusetts, New York,
an exclusion of this sort was commonly categorized as a "defect" of "religious belief' or
"religious sentiment," which makes one "insensible to the obligation of the oath" and
thus unfit to take an oath or participate in the legal process. STEWART RAPALE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WITNESSES 11-12 (1887).
111 2 HAWKINS, supra note 106, § 15, at 146.
112 Justice Story is among the many scholars and commentators who have noted that
the "whole structure" of American "jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of
the common law." 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruTION § 157, at 110
(5th ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1994) (1891). In his Commentaries, Kent defines
the common law as "those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the
government and security of person and property, which do not rest for their authority
upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature." 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 471 (12th ed., O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 1873) (1826).
Harlan Stone described the "distinguishing characteristics" of the common law as "its
development of law by a system of judicial precedent [which is the heart of Kent's
definition], its use of the jury to decide issues of fact, and its all-pervading doctrine of the
supremacy of law... [that government and individuals alike] must conform to legal rules
developed and applied by courts." Stone, supra note 104, at 5. Such a broad
understanding of the common law is fitting given the scholarly debate over the
precedential role it played in each of the states both before and after the American
Revolution. One commentator describes the question as such: did the adoption of the
common law have the effect of making the decisions of different states uniform (as
binding authority or stare decisis), or did its adoption provide guidance as a "scientific
system of law" that each state can shape separately and distinctly (thus, persuasive
authority)? Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L.
REV. 6, passim (1910) (finding that the latter more accurately describes the role of the
common law in early America). See also Stone, supra, at 10-13.
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New Jersey, and Maryland via their constitutions.11 3 The overtly religious
character of the Colonies and early America, as well as the blending of
church and state during this period, was also influential inasmuch as in
"some of the colonies the law of God was preferred to the common law."'"14
It should come as no surprise, then, that the common law's oath
requirement-the religiously-oriented oath with the accompanying witness
competency requirements-was embraced first in the Colonies and then in
the States. Later, when America established its first laws and legal
procedures regarding oaths, it continued to borrow extensively from its
English forbearers.
The value of the common law in early America, and thus common law
traditions such as the oath "was not [derived], for the most part, [from] an
appeal to the decisions of English courts in matters of private rights, but
[rather as a system used to protect] . . . matters affecting the personal liberty
and political privileges of the citizens."115 The "political privilege" or civic
responsibility of proffering testimony, serving as a juror,. holding public
office, and the like all required oaths, and therefore oath practices and
traditions were immediately needed and adopted.
Oaths attained prominence in the United States Constitution through
their use in inaugurating some of the most significant government
obligations. 116 Although the Constitution does not prescribe it, George
113 1 KENT, supra note 112, at 472-73.
114 Pope, supra note 112, at 16-17; see also Harry S. Stout, Word and Order in
Colonial New England, in THE BIBLE IN AMERICA 19,passim (Nathan 0. Hatch & Mark
A. Noll eds., 1982) ("Throughout the colonial period the vernacular Bible interpreted by
a learned ministry remained the mainstay of New England Culture.... Despite divisions
between the people and their ministers... all shared in an unbroken allegiance to the
Bible as the inspired Word of God and infallible rule for all issues of life."); FRANK
LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA (2003)
(discussing the role of religion in colonial America and the particular religious heritage
from England).
115 Pope, supra note 112, at 16 (emphasis added).
116The United States Constitution and its Amendments incorporate oath
requirements, albeit not testimonial or evidentiary, at four places: art. I, § 3, cl. 6
(Senators "shall be on Oath or Affirmation" when sitting for the purpose of
impeachment); art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (the President shall take the enumerated oath or
affirmation before entering office); art. VI, cl. 3 (Senators, Representatives, members of
State legislatures, and all federal and State executive and judicial officers "shall be bound
by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution"); amend. IV (requiring an oath or
affirmation to obtain a warrant). See also amend. XIV, § 3 (prohibiting a person from
serving in an elected office articulated in Article VI when "having previously taken an
oath" of such an office and participated in an insurrection, rebellion, or "given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof"). See generally 2 STORY, supra note 112, §§ 1843-46, at
613-15 (discussing the importance of oaths and thus oath requirements in the
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Washington's famous addition of the phrase "so help me God" at the
conclusion of the Presidential oath of office initiated an overtly religious
tradition that continues to this day. 117 As previously noted, Washington was
not the first oath taker to invoke God, but his status as the original American
hero may explain the addition of a divine invocation to all types of American
oaths. Judicial oaths (both testimonial and otherwise) continued to be
governed by the post-Omychund common law rule, which was reinforced by
the preeminent contemporary philosophers. 18
The usual form of oaths for criminal cases, upon which American oaths
were based, provided that "'[t]he evidence you shall give between our
Constitution); PAULEY, supra note 32 (providing a thorough discussion of the
Presidential oath of office and developments in oaths of office). Interestingly, one of the
few changes to the United States Constitution made by the Confederate States of America
was the addition in their preamble of an explicit reference to God. James E. Pfander, So
Help Me God. Religion And Presidential Oath-Taking, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 549, 551
(1999).
117 PAULEY, supra note 32, at 108-09; see also Pfander, supra note 116 (arguing
that the Constitution's conspicuous omission of any reference to God, particularly in the
presidential oath, was likely a deliberate attempt to refrain from creating a religious test
for office, and that without Washington's addition some of America's ceremonies may be
vastly different today).
118 John Locke, for one, supported the common law rule. Although Locke was not
an American, his influence on the founding fathers (like that of the Enlightenment
philosophers in general) is well-documented. Commenting on atheists and their ability to
partake in political institutions, Locke agreed with the common law rule and the necessity
of the oath's religious component to society, declaring that those people
are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants,
and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an
atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all;
besides, also, all those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion,
can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of
toleration.
JOHN LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION 32 (William Popple trans., Kessigner
Publishing 2004) (1689); see also JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY:
CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 217-43 (2002)
(explaining how Locke viewed divine sanctions as key to the law, how oaths-which
ensure and remind the individual of sanctions-lend stability to human affairs, and how
alternatives to oaths and traditional forms of hierarchy are insufficient to support social
cohesion). Locke restates the overriding importance of oaths and what they represent,
even to the rulers of a society, in his infamous Second Treatise, originally published the
same year: "No body, no power, can exempt them [the "princes"] from the obligations of
that eternal law. Those are so great and so strong in the case of promises that
omnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises, and oaths, are bonds that hold
the Almighty." LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 15, § 195, at 89.
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sovereign lord the king and the prisoner at the bar shall be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, So help you God!'; upon which the
witness kisses the book." 119 In civil cases, the form varied slightly: "The
evidence that you shall give to the Court and jury, touching the matters in
question, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; So help
you God!"' 120 The profound religious character of the time informed early
American practices, and given this milieu, oath forms that included Christian
preferences were readily accepted in the new republic. 121 Indeed, oaths were
119 JOSEPH CHITY, CRImuNAL LAW 616 (4th American ed., 1841). Professor
Wigmore noted, in 1904, that the "custom of kissing the Book is now coming to be
generally recognized as both repulsive and unsanitary; celluloid covers are sometimes
provided. But it should be clearly understood that the ceremony of kissing is for most
persons a wholly unessential feature." WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 1818, at 2353 n.3
(citing 20 Montreal Legal News 274).
120 WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 1818, at 2353.
121 It is appropriate to pause and consider the religious nature of America at its
founding. The political revisionism in contemporary times portrays early America as
apathetic to religious belief and hostile to religious expression in the public square, as
characterized by the absolutist "wall of separation." It also helps explain a trend of
increasingly secular oath taking in America. Quite to the contrary, any objective study of
early America reveals that the country was founded with Christian principles in mind,
and these beliefs helped inform the establishment of American political and civil
institutions. In his Commentaries, Justice Story describes this sentiment:
In fact, every American colony, from its foundation down to the revolution, with the
exception of Rhode Island, if, indeed, that state be an exception, did openly, by the
whole course of its laws and institutions, support and sustain, in some form the
Christian religion; and almost invariably gave a peculiar sanction to some of its
fundamental doctrines. And this has continued to be the case in some of the states
down to the present period, without the slightest suspicion that it was against the
principles of public law or republican liberty. (citation omitted). Indeed, in a
republic, there would seem to be a peculiar propriety in viewing the Christian
religion as the great basis on which it must rest its support and permanence, if it be,
what it has ever been deemed by its truest friends to be, the religion of
liberty.... But the duty of supporting religion, and especially the Christian religion,
is very different from the right to force the consciences of other men or to punish
them for worshipping God in the manner which they believe their accountability to
him requires.
2 STORY, supra note 112, §§ 1873-76, at 629-31. Chief Justice John Marshall
similarly observed that the "American population is entirely Christian, & with us,
Christianity & Religion is identified. It would be strange, indeed, if with such a people,
our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, & did not often refer to it, & exhibit
relations with it." Letter from John Marshall, Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court
to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1833), quoted in DANIEL DRIESBACH, RELIGION AND POLITICS
IN THE EARLY REPuBLIC: JASPER ADAMS AND THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE 113 (1996).
These characterizations of early America are consistent with those of other founding
fathers. See also Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An
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held in such high regard by the Framers that a bill regarding oaths of office
was the first legislation passed by the inaugural Congress and signed by
President Washington.122
The history of oaths in America after its founding, like that of American
law generally at this time, is defined by the transition from appropriated
English common law to distinctively American jurisprudence. This process
did not signal the abandonment of America's English heritage; rather, it
reflected the unique American experience that helped shape the trajectory of
the young nation's law in light of its economic and social challenges,
particularly after the Civil War. 123 The decentralization of political and legal
authority emerged as a dominant theme. As contrasted to a "common" law of
England, America's law developed within a federalist system, and thus its
oath forms and practices evolved in divergent ways within different
jurisdictions. By the turn of the twentieth century, almost every State had
adopted some legislation pertaining to oaths. 124 As Professor Wigmore
commented, the "provisions sometimes are inconsistent, sometimes duplicate
Examination of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and
the Christian Religion in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 927 (1996).
Any attempt to reduce the founders' religious views to a single proposition,
however, oversimplifies the diversity of their backgrounds and opinions about the
appropriate role for religion in public life. See generally Arlin M. Adams & Charles J.
Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559 (1989) (describing
the three primary (and divergent) groupings of the founders' attitudes toward religion's
role in public life, but noting that all three were devoted to the idea of America being a
country based on the principles of religious liberty). Nevertheless, one must consider the
dominant role of religion when this country was founded-and the preeminent status of
the Christian Bible-as this influenced civil traditions such as oath practices.
122 2 STORY, supra note 112, § 1845-46, at 614-15 (noting also that one of the
perceived weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation was that no oath of office was
required, the Constitution prescribes an oath of office, and Congress's first act (Act of 1 st
June, 1789, c. 1), which passed "without much opposition," specified the time and
manner of oath taking); Dreisbach, supra note 121, at 979.
123 See Stone, supra note 104, at 11
If one were to attempt to write a history of the law in the United States, it would
be largely an account of the means by which the common-law system has been
able to make progress through a period of exceptionally rapid social and
economic change.... In the brief space of about seventy years [after the Civil
War] our law has been called upon to accommodate itself to changes of
conditions, social and economic, more marked and extensive in their creation of
new interests requiring legal protection and control, than occurred in the three
centuries which followed the discovery of America.
124 WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 1828, at 2364. For a thorough synopsis of oath
requirements at the turn of the century catalogued by state, see id. at 2364-71 n. 1.
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each other without need, [and] sometimes are merely declaratory of the
common law." 125
Continuing the trend that began with Omychund, developments in the
law pertaining to oaths often concerned matters of capacity and competency.
Attention was focused on children, the mentally incompetent, and non-
believers. At least thirty-three states and territories, via their constitutions or
statutes, resolved that non-believers had the capacity to take oaths, while
slightly more than a dozen jurisdictions retained the more exclusive common
law rule.126 State constitutions typically protected individual civil capabilities
and rights from religious discrimination, while state statutes concentrated on
oath practices, language, and other practical features. Specific oath forms
were often specified by law and generally required the most "obligatory"
variation of the oath be used when necessary. 127 These developments
continued well into the twentieth century, where States, and sometimes the
federal government, 28 modified their rules to excise religious criteria as a
basis for determining capacity. Despite the many cultural and legal trends
toward greater inclusivity, as recently as 1961 the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to strike down a narrow, religiously-based oath
requirement that closely resembled the English common law rule. 129
With the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, standardization
would again be promoted with respect to the basic principles governing
oaths, if not the specific forms of oaths themselves. The Federal Rules were
developed by the Supreme Court and formally adopted in 1975. The Rules
applied directly to the federal courts and served as model rules for the states,
where they were widely incorporated in varying degrees. As the Rules were
evidentiary in nature, they focused on the competency of witnesses to testify
rather than the qualifications of judges and jurors.
Regarding witness competency, Rules 601 and 610 provide general
guidance that is, in many respects, consistent with the holding in Omychund.
These Rules mitigate the common law approach, which held that certain
people, such as minors and those without religious convictions, were
12 5 Id., § 1828, at2364.
126 White, supra note 10, at 395, 395-401 n.41. As Professor White's analysis
makes clear, finding the precise number of states or territories that had adopted a specific
rule was difficult at the time given the ambiguity of courts' interpretation of state
constitutions and statutes.
127 WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 1829(2), at 2373.
128 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (2007) (establishing that an accused shall be deemed
competent to testify at his trial).
129 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (holding that the requirement of
declaration of a belief in the existence of God, as a test for office, invaded the freedom of
belief and religion of the petitioner).
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categorically incompetent and thus could not take a witness oath or proffer
testimony. Rule 601 provides instead that all people shall be deemed
competent unless the contrary can be demonstrated. 130 The Advisory
Committee's notes characterize the Rule as a "general ground-clearing,"
which was undertaken because a "witness wholly without capacity is difficult
to imagine" and thus discretion should be "exercised in favor of allowing the
testimony." 131 The Committee notes also recognize that an oath or
affirmation's efficacy rests on its capacity to impress upon a witness the
moral duty to testify truthfully.132 Further, Rule 610 both protects against
disqualification of witnesses based on religious beliefs and prohibits the
introduction of such evidence to discredit or enhance testimony. 133
Federal Rule 603 codifies the requirement that every witness shall have
to swear an oath or affirm that he will testify truthfully.' 34 The Rule does not
prescribe a particular oath, providing instead that the form used shall be one
that is "calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the
witness' mind with the duty to do so [testify truthfully]."'135 This approach
affords "the flexibility required in dealing with religious adults, atheists,
conscientious objectors, mental defectives, and children"'136 for a variety of
130 FED. R. EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules.").
131 FED. R. EvID. 601 advisory committee notes (1973).
132 Id. ("Standards of moral qualification in practice consist essentially of evaluating
a person's truthfulness in terms of his own answers about it. ... This result may,
however, be accomplished more directly, and without haggling in terms of legal
standards, by the manner of administering the oath or affirmation under Rule 603.").
133 FED. R. EvID. 610 ("Evidence of the belief or opinions of a witness on matters of
religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the
witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced.").
134 FED. R. EvID. 603 ("Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare
that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the
duty to do so."). Note that Rule 604 makes the oath or affirmation requirement applicable
to interpreters. FED. R. EvID. 604. Note also that Rule 603 has an additional purpose
besides encouraging truthful testimony; it responds to the Supreme Court holding that the
use of an oath or affirmation is an essential part of the Sixth Amendment protections
relating to confrontation. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)
("Confrontation... insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the
possibility of a penalty for perjury").
135 FED. R. EvID. 603 & Advisory Committee Notes (1973) ("no special verbal
formula is required").
136 FED. R. EvID. 603 Advisory Committee Notes (1973).
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issues involving oaths.' 37 Rule 603 does not, however, mandate the best
means of swearing a witness, or for a court to accept whatever oath form the
witness may prefer because it is claimed to be more personally efficacious.
Rather, the Rule simply requires that any oath to be used is reasonably
calculated to awaken the conscience of the witness. 138 The Rule's deliberate
lack of specificity has provoked considerable litigation regarding the form
for oaths and testimonial disqualifications. 139 Rule 603 favors religious
137 Federal Rule 104(a) grants the court (judge) the duty to reach conclusions on
"[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness," and
thus under this authority the court can determine the appropriate form of an oath or
affirmation. The Rules are silent regarding who should administer the oath, what words
should be employed, what gestures or artifacts (if any) should be used, etc., and thus the
court may inquire as to what is proper given the specific situation, and ultimately what is
likely to awaken the witness's conscience.
138U.S. v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 710 (11th Cir. 1993) (the court did not err in
allowing the testimony of an atheist witness who took an oath to God to tell the truth).
Similarly, it need not be demonstrated that the oath did, in fact, awaken the conscience of
the witness.
139 See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 348 U.S. 966, 967 (1955) ("no requirement
that the word 'solemnly' be used in the affirmation"); Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d
19, 24 (2d Cir. 1991) ("When children testify, the trial court may fashion an oath or
affirmation that is meaningful to the witness."); United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405,
1406 (4th Cir. 1969) (where witness had religious objections to words employed in oath
and raising his hand, trial court erred in refusing to permit witness to testify on grounds
he would not raise his hand and take an oath); United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 185
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1979) (witness was properly prevented from
testifying when he refused to declare he would tell the truth and would only state "I am a
truthful man" and "I would not tell a lie to stay out of jail"); Gordon v. Idaho, 778 F.2d
1397, 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that deponents need not raise their right hands when
making an affirmation; the district court "should have explored the least restrictive means
of assuring that Gordon would testify truthfully at his deposition"); United States v.
Ward, 973 F.2d 730, 731, amended andsuperceded on other grounds, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court had to yield to defendant's First Amendment
right to substitute "fully integrated honesty" for the word "truth" in the traditional witness
oath); Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 351 U.S.
943 (1956) (holding that failure to object to the admission of unswom testimony
effectively waived defendant's right to appeal the issue where foreign-language witnesses
were sworn in without a translator); State v. Sands, 467 A.2d 202 (N.H. 1983) (signed
statement with notice of penalty equivalent to an oath); Staton v. Fought, 486 So. 2d 745,
745 (La. 1986) ("Instead of requiring an oath, the trial judge may permit the use of the
following: 'I, _ , do hereby declare that the facts I am about to give are, to the best of
my knowledge and belief, accurate, correct and complete."'); State v. Paolella, 561 A.2d
111, 118-19 (Conn. 1989) (informal colloquy between judge and child witness sufficient
to satisfy oath requirement); Commonwealth v. Chuck, 323 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1974) (stating in dicta that a witness may be barred on the basis of religion if his faith
commands him to not tell the truth where the witness was a member of Satanism);
Collins v. State, 465 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (a mere assertion of
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tolerance, both in declining to impose a specified form of oath, as well as,
together with Rule 601, decoupling moral considerations from testimonial
competency determinations. Accordingly, although oath forms and practices
still vary among jurisdictions, rules favoring inclusivity and a presumption of
competence and capacity have been widely adopted.
The common law approach affording flexibility so as to encourage truth,
as it is expressed in the Federal Rules, is likewise found in most
contemporary state statutes and rules. Neither the United States Constitution
nor modern federal statutes require any particular form of oath.' 40 Certain
state statutes permit, and sometimes even encourage, accommodating various
oath forms in order to bind more closely the conscience of oath-takers. For
instance, Alabama provides that an oath or affirmation to tell the truth is
necessary before testifying, and that the "court may frame such affirmation
according to the religious faith of the witness." 141 Likewise, Arizona
specifies that an "oath or affirmation shall be administered in a manner
which will best awaken the conscience and impress the mind of the person
taking the oath or affirmation, and it shall be taken upon the penalty of
perjury.' 142
Many present-day courtroom oaths do not require the use of the Bible,1 43
which is explicitly permitted by statute only in seven states:
truth, without an attestation to that effect by an unequivocal act for which a prosecution
for perjury will lie, is not sufficient as an oath).
140 See FED. R. EVID. 603; United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1018-20 (9th Cir.
1992) (elucidating the factors relevant to a determination of whether one's religion or
religious beliefs should compel the use of an idiosyncratic oath). While there is no
required form, the American Jurisprudence Pleading and Practice Forms suggest two
common variations:
"You do solemnly swear to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. So help you God."
"You do solemnly _ [swear or affirm] that the evidence you __ [shall
or are about to] give in this __ [matter or issue], pending between __
and _____, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God."
AM. JUR. PL. & PR. FORMs 25B Witnesses § 155-56 (2007).
141 ALA. CODE § 12-21-136 (1975).
142 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2221(A) (2003). Similarly, the Arizona state
constitution explicitly provides that the form of oath should be that which is "most
consistent with and binding upon the conscience" of the oath taker. ARIz. CONST. art. 2 §
7.
143 See, e.g., Cox v. State, 79 S.E. 909, 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913). See also State v.
Davis, 418 S.E.2d 263, 265 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), pet. denied, 426 S.E.2d 710 (N.C.
1993) (noting that "it is not necessary for a witness to understand the obligation to tell the
truth from a religious point of view.").
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Arkansas, 144 Delaware, 145 Kansas, 146 New Jersey, 147 North Carolina,148
Pennsylvania, 149 and Virginia. 150 State laws usually grant considerable
latitude concerning an acceptable form for oaths and affirmations.151 Indeed,
most make no reference to any sacred artifacts, allowing oath takers simply
to refer to God, affirm they will tell the truth, or use some other method
intended to promote truthful testimony. 152 In two of the seven states that
144 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-2-101(a) (2007) ("The usual mode of administering oaths
practiced by the person who swears, laying his hand on and kissing the Gospels, shall be
observed in all cases in which an oath is or may be required by law to be administered,
except as otherwise provided in this chapter.").
145 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5321 (2007) ("The usual oath in this State shall be by
swearing upon the Holy Evangels of Almighty God. The person to whom an oath is
administered shall lay his or her right hand upon the book.").
146 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102 (2006) ("All oaths shall be administered by laying the
right hand upon the Holy Bible, or by the uplifted right hand.").
147 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 41:1-4 (2004) ("It shall not be necessary to the solemnity or
obligation of an oath administered in any court of justice or any legal proceeding, civil or
criminal, in this state, for the person taking the oath to kiss the holy scriptures, but the
taking of such oath, while the hand shall be held upon the book, shall answer all the
purposes and requirements of the law, any usage or custom to the contrary heretofore
notwithstanding. If any persons so swom shall swear falsely they shall be guilty of
perjury as though the book had been kissed.").
148 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 11-2 (2005) ("Judges and other persons who may be
empowered to administer oaths, shall ... require the party to be swom to lay his hand
upon the Holy Scriptures, in token of his engagement to speak the truth and in further
token that, if he should swerve from the truth, he may be justly deprived of all the
blessings of that holy book and made liable to that vengeance which he has imprecated
on his own head.").
149 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5901(a) (2007) ("Every witness, before giving any
testimony shall take an oath in the usual or common form, by laying the hand upon an
open copy of the Holy Bible, or by lifting up the right hand and pronouncing or assenting
to the following words: 'I, A. B., do swear by Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts,
that I will, and that as I shall answer to God at the last great day."').
150 VA. CODE ANN. § 49-10 (2007) ("No officer of this Commonwealth, or any
political subdivision thereof, shall, in administering an oath in pursuance of law, require
or request any person taking the oath to kiss the Holy Bible, or any book or books
thereof, but persons being sworn for any purpose may be required to place their hand on
the Holy Bible.").
151 See, e.g., H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258,
262 (Alaska 1977), order supplemented, 566 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1977) (holding that
"substantial compliance" with those elements necessary to form the legal document
would be sufficient to satisfy the broadly formulated statutory requirements).
152 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2094 (2007) ("(a) An oath, affirmation, or
declaration in an action or a proceeding, may be administered by obtaining an affirmative
response to one of the following questions: (1) 'Do you solemnly state that the evidence
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expressly allow for the use of the Bible in courtroom oaths, their laws permit
non-Christians to be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of their
religions. 153  Such statutory and judicial accommodations encourage
witnesses to tell the truth by allowing them to swear an oath or make an
affirmation in a form that they consider most binding on their consciences.
C. Affirmation: From a Religious Exception to Taking Exception to
Religion
Like an oath, affirmation acts as a guarantor of truth; unlike an oath,
affirmation does not involve an invocation of a divine authority. Affirmation
does retain all of the other key elements that provide significance to an oath:
a public proclamation that is formally made in a way designed to awaken the
conscience of the person affirming, under the penalty of perjury.
The contemporary origins of affirmations can be traced to an attempt to
accommodate particular Christian sects, most notably the Quakers, which
prohibit the swearing of oaths.154 At common law, Quakers and other minor
Christian sects who refused to swear an oath--even an unconventional or
"heathen" oath-were not only precluded from giving testimony but could
also be fined or otherwise punished. 155 Ironically, popular sentiment at the
time held Quakers in high regard, and they were widely "recognized to be the
most truthful. '156 As a consequence, Quakers received parliamentary relief
you shall give in this issue (or matter) shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?' (2) 'Do you solemnly state, under penalty of perjury, that the
evidence that you shall give in this issue (or matter) shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth?' (b) In the alternative to the forms prescribed in subdivision
(a), the court may administer an oath, affirmation, or declaration in an action or a
proceeding in a manner that is calculated to awaken the person's conscience and impress
the person's mind with the duty to tell the truth. The court shall satisfy itself that the
person testifying understands that his or her testimony is being given under penalty of
perjury.").
153 Delaware's statute provides that "[a] person believing in any other than the
Christian religion, may be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of such person's
religion, if there be any such." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5324 (2007). Arkansas's statute
makes similar accommodation: "Every person believing in any religion other than the
Christian religion shall be swom according to the peculiar ceremonies of his religion, if
there are any such ceremonies, instead of any of the other modes prescribed in this
section." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-2-101(e) (2007).
154 See supra note 45, for a complete discussion of Christ's prohibition against
swearing oaths and how that statement has been interpreted by Christian philosophers and
most modem Christian churches.
155 White, supra note 10, at 420 & n.85.
156 Id. at 421.
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during the reign of William and Mary and after the Omychund decision. As
Tyler notes:
Perhaps the incongruity of receiving the evidence of a mendacious Hindoo
swinging the tail of a cow in his hand, or of a Chinaman burning a joss stick
or cracking a saucer and invariably grinning as he did it, and refusing to
hear that of the plain, simple, straightforward Friend, finally forced itself
upon the prejudiced minds of the British legislators. 157
The evident need to modernize the law to permit these sects full political
participation continued a trend that first allowed groups like the Jews, and
later other non-Christians full access to courts. Thus in 1688, Parliament
passed the first of several reforms permitting the substitution of a
"declaration of fidelity" for an oath of allegiance, which was extended in
1696 to allow for affirmations more generally. 158 The initial accommodation
of orthodox religions was expanded to include other sects (e.g., Moravians
and Separatists), those who have a conscientious objection to swearing, and
eventually atheists and other non-believers. 159
Just as the United States received its oath heritage from England, so too
did England provide the basis for American legal standards for affirmations.
In 1682, prior to the Quaker legislation, predictably only Pennsylvania-
designated a Quaker province by William Penn-attempted to allow for
affirmation in their founding laws; this provision was repealed by the English
government in 1693.160 Shortly thereafter, the American colonies received
legislation passed by Parliament in 1696, which had the full effect of colonial
law and granted the privilege of affirmation to Quakers. 16 1 By the time of the
Declaration of Independence, Tyler observes that all of the colonies
157 Id. at 420.
158 Id. at 420-21. The language was revised in 1721 so that it would be adopted for
common use, as follows: "I A.B. do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm..."
Quakers Act, 1721, 8 Geo., c. 6.
159 Id. at 421. It was provided that
[e]very person upon objecting to being sworn, and stating, as the ground of such
objection, either that he has no religious belief or that the taking of an oath is
contrary to his religious belief, shall be permitted to make his solemn affirmation
instead of taking an oath in all places and for all purposes where an oath is or shall
be required by law, which affirmation shall be of the same force and effect as if he
had taken the oath.
Oaths Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c.46 (citing Oaths Act, 1888, 51& 21 Vict., c.46).
160 White, supra note 10, at 422. The effect of this law and the English
government's delay in reacting meant that for several years after the founding of
Pennsylvania, no oaths were sworn whatsoever in the colony. Id. at 444, n. 126.
161 Id. at 422-23.
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"generally provided for the affirmation of Quakers; some included Dunkers
and Mennonites, and a few all persons having religious scruples against
swearing." 162 Those colonies with no express provisions followed the
contemporaneous common law, which permitted only Quakers to choose
affirmation. 163
By the time of the American founding, affirmation had become so widely
accepted that it was expressly incorporated into the United States
Constitution at each place where an oath is required. 164 Similar to the
treatment of oaths in America, the options surrounding the use of
affirmation-what language would be used, who could qualify to affirm,
etc.-varied among jurisdictions and were expressed in state constitutions,
statutes, and common law. By the turn of the twentieth century, every
jurisdiction except Oklahoma that had passed a statute on the subject allowed
the choice of affirmation, either to persons who were forbidden by
"conscientious scruples" or anyone who may have such a preference.1 65
These distinctions, too, were eventually discarded as affirmation became a
universal privilege. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
twentieth century courts made explicit their belief about the equality between
oaths and affirmations, 166 and Congress expressly indicated this as well. 167
The Federal Rules ultimately codified the coexistence of oaths and
162 Id. at 423.
163 Id.; see, e.g., In re McIntire's Case, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 157 (1803) (affirmation by
a juror not a Quaker, and not attached to any particular religious sect, was not permitted);
In re Bryan's Case, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 151 (1804) (a juror was not allowed to make
affirmation in lieu of oath, on the ground that he was a Methodist, where it was not
contrary to the principles of that religious society to take an oath); King v. Fearson, 3
D.C. (3 Cranch) 435 (1829) (affirmation instead of oath was permitted where the witness
had applied for admission to full participation in the membership of the society of
Quakers, and usually met with them for worship).
164 See supra note 116 (discussing the place of oaths in the Constitution); see also
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83 (1789) (giving United States courts the
power to "impose and administer all necessary oaths and affirmations"); ch. 20,
§ 30, 1 Stat. 88-89 (providing that "examination of witnesses in open court" shall be
governed by the common law, whereby every witness "shall be... sworn or affirmed to
testify the whole truth").
165 WIGMORE, supra note 76, § 1828, at 2371.
166 See, e.g., Chee v. Long Island R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1964) ("No
reason in law exists for differentiation in the quality of truth between oath and
affirmation. Plaintiffs capacity to tell the truth and the truthfulness of his testimony [after
affirming] were not diminished in any way by his failure to take an oath and no statement
that they might have been should have been made.").
167 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2007) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise... 'oath' includes affirmation, and 'sworn'
includes affirmed.").
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affirmations in American courts. 168 It is indeed ironic that affirmation, which
began as a means for including specified religious sects, is now the preferred
means for accommodating atheists and non-believers.
In summary, oaths and affirmations are widely and interchangeably used
in contemporary America in a variety of circumstances, while retaining
particular significance in courtroom settings. Their ubiquity rests in part on a
shared understanding of their basis, relevance, and potency, which is
predicated upon the dominant influence of the Judeo-Christian heritage on
the Western legal traditions. As America has become more religiously
diverse, it is fitting to consider whether and how different religious traditions
and beliefs should be incorporated into civil oath taking. Given the
increasing presence and influence of Muslims in American culture, the
question of religious diversity and oaths will be examined with respect to
Islam and the Quran.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MUHAMMAD, THE QURAN AND ISLAM
A. Muhammad and the Growth of Islam
Because the significance of the Quran to Muslims is best understood in
the context of the birth and rise of Islam, 169 it is appropriate to begin with a
brief sketch of the history of the religion, which starts with the life of its
168 See supra notes 129-40 & 166, and accompanying text (discussing oath and
affirmation in the Federal Rules of Evidence). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
likewise provide that whenever an oath is required to be taken, a solemn affirmation may
be accepted in lieu thereof. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b). Similarly, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure state that "'Oath' includes an affirmation." FED. R. CRIM. P. l(b)(6); see also
United States v. Kalaydjian, 784 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the district court's
decision refusing to allow counsel to cross-exam a witness on his decision to affirm
rather than swear an oath, finding that Rule 603 would be "meaningless if a witness, after
exercising his right to affirm, could be cross-examined regarding the reasons underlying
that decision").
169 A complete account of Islam, one of the world's largest and most influential
religions, is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, some appreciation of the
historical, political, and cultural aspects of the development of Islam contributes to a
fuller understanding of the religion. For the purposes of this Article, only the broadest
treatment is given. For further reading, the following texts are recommended: on the
history of Islam: MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND
HISTORY IN A WORLD CIVILIZATION (1977) [three volume set]; on the history of the
Middle East: ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT JR., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST (7th
ed. 2001), and PETER MANSFIELD, A HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST (2d ed. 2004); on the
life of Muhammad: MUHAMMAD HUSAYN HAYKAL, THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD (Isma'il
Rgi A. al Frfiqi trans., 1976); KAREN ARMSTRONG, MUHAMMAD, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
PROPHET (1992), and AKBAR S. AHMED, ISLAM TODAY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE
MUSLIM WORLD, 12-21 (2002) [hereinafter AHMED, ISLAM TODAY].
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Prophet: Muhammad. 170 Born in Mecca around 570 AD, 171 Muhammad was
orphaned at a young age and raised by his grandfather and uncle. 172 Later, he
became a merchant and led caravans to Syria and Mesopotamia. 173 After
marrying at the age of twenty-five, Muhammad earned a livelihood by
engaging in various commercial pursuits. 174 Every year during the month of
Ramadan, Muhammad would take his family to Mount Hira to make a
spiritual retreat where he would pray, fast, and distribute alms and food to the
poor who visited him. 175
On one occasion of reflection, during the month of Ramadan in
Muhammad's fortieth year, the Muslim faith teaches that Muhammad
experienced his first revelation from the angel Gabriel, who told him that he
had been appointed the "Messenger of God." 176 Although he was at first
skeptical of their authenticity, 177 Muhammad quickly came to believe that he
had been appointed God's Messenger, and he thereafter began to receive
many more revelations. 178 These inspired teachings, which continued over
the next twenty to twenty-three years, would eventually be collected and
unified into the Quran. 179
170 Although the name "Muhammad" has been spelled in English in various ways,
this Article will adopt the spelling "Muhammad" as used by Akbar S. Ahmed, the Ibn
Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies and Professor of International Relations at the
American University, Washington D.C., in his book, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169.
171 AHMED, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169, at 14.
172 Id.
173 ARMSTRONG, supra note 169, at 79.
174 BRUCE LAWRENCE, THE QuR'AN: A BIOGRAPHY 21-22 (2006).
175 Id.; ARMSTRONG, supra note 169, at 45; but see HAYKAL, supra note 169, at 70-
72 (indicating that Muhammad may have spent his annual spiritual retreats alone in a
cave at the head of Mount Hira).
176 AHMED, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169, at 16-17. Perhaps in the interest of
making Islam more familiar and presentable to non-Muslim readers, and also to describe
more accurately Islamic theology, modem scholarship tends to refer to the one, supreme
god of Islam as "God" rather than "Allah." See 1 HODGSON, supra note 169, at 63 ("To
use 'Allah' in English can therefore imply, accordingly, the notion that Muslims honour
something different from what is honoured by Christians and Jews... and presumably
something imaginary.... This is essentially a dogmatic position and can be allowed only
in those ready to admit its theological implications."). This Article will use the term
"God" to refer to the god of Islam.
177 FARID ESACK, THE QuRAN: A USER'S GUIDE 40 (2005).
178 AHMED, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169, at 17.
179 ESACK, supra note 177, at 32-33. The word "Quran" has numerous English
translations, with the most prevalent being "Koran" (see KNUT VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD
AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 31 (2005)), "Qur'an" (see ESACK, supra
note 177, at 41), and "Quran" (see GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 169, at 27). This Article
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The early revelations to Muhammad centered around three principles: (1)
God, who was the source of the revelations, was absolutely one, 180 (2)
Muhammad was the true Prophet of God, 18' and (3) all people would be held
accountable to this one God on a "Day of Resurrection."' 182 Following his
calling as the Prophet and Messenger of God, Muhammad slowly began to
convert Meccans to his discipleship. 183 As the religious beliefs of the Meccan
tribes were so intimately tied to their political and economic power, 184
however, Muhammad's eventual success as a proselytizer angered the
Meccan ruling class, who held polytheistic religious beliefs. 185 For several
years, Muhammad and his followers were religiously persecuted and socially
ostracized. 186
In 622, Muhammad traveled with his followers to Yathrib, a city roughly
250 miles north of Mecca. 187 Over the next six years, Muhammad converted
much of the city to his new religion and established himself as a powerful
political leader through means both peaceful and forceful. 188 He thereafter
will adopt the transliteration "Quran" used by Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., Professor
Emeritus of Middle East History at Pennsylvania State University. As a matter of
convention, the word "Quran" is not italicized in this Article.
180 Islamic monotheism has three aspects: (1) Oneness of the Lordship of God; (2)
Oneness of the worship of God (none other than God has the right to be worshipped); and
(3) Oneness of the names and qualities of God. THE TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS OF
SUMMARIZED SAHIH AL-BUKHARI 1066 (Muhammad Muhsin Khan trans., 1996).
181 This is sometimes interpreted as belief in the message of Muhammad as the Final
Prophet. See, e.g., MUHAMMAD SAED ABDUL-RAHMAN, 1 ISLAM: QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS: BASIC TENETS OF FAITH: BELIEF 270 (2003).
182 ESACK, supra note 177, at 45. Also, there are Five Pillars of Islam: Shahada
(profession of faith), Salat (ritual prayer), Zakat (paying alms), Sawm (fasting in the
month of Ramadan), and Hajj (making the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during
one's life). Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy
in Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 56 n.3 (2002).
183 ARMSTRONG, supra note 169, at 91, 102-04, 107. The first followers of
Muhammad were relatives and friends. ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC THOUGHT: AN
INTRODUCTION 2-3 (2006).
184 1 HODGSON, supra note 169, at 155.
185 ESACK, supra note 177, at 45.
186 Id.
187 AH'MED, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169, at 17-18. This journey is called the hira
and marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. Yathrib is now known as Medina.
188 ESACK, supra note 177, at 47-51. Although many people in Medina and the
surrounding areas converted to Islam peacefully, often Muhammad's peace treaties,
offered after bloody warfare, were conditioned on the defeated party or tribe converting
to the Muslim faith. See 1 HODGSON, supra note 169, at 192-93 ("Among the tribes
outside Medina, most were pagan and were increasingly required to become Muslims as a
condition of entering into league with Muhammad and into his security system.").
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engaged in a series of military and diplomatic initiatives between 628 and
630 that resulted in the re-taking of Mecca, 189 which would soon become the
religious center of the Muslim faith. To this day, faithful Muslims make a
pilgrimage-hajj -to Mecca to pray around the Ka'bah, a large, black,
cube-like structure that is the holiest site in the Muslim religion' 90 because it
is regarded as the first dwelling place of God on earth, built by Adam, and
eventually restored by Abraham and Ishmael. 191
Upon Muhammad's death in 632,192 a serious division arose regarding
the relationship between the religion Muhammad had established and the
political regime that had been conceived and nurtured in the context of that
religion. 193 To this day, the rupture between the Sunni and Shi'ite sects of
Islam essentially centers on a dispute about who can rightfully claim to be
Muhammad's true followers and what constitutes the Islamic state. 194
Nevertheless, certain features of Islam relevant to the Quran emerged as
universal across all sects of the Muslim faith: the text of the Quran is the
authoritative revelation of God, Muhammad was the true Prophet and
Messenger of God, and the moral and religious instructions contained in the
Quran are binding on all Muslims. 195
A great religious and political force, Islam spread rapidly over the next
200 years, with a united Islamic state eventually laying political and religious
claim by the eleventh century over the Arabian Peninsula, northern Africa,
Mesopotamia, central Asia, Spain, and parts of Italy. 196 During this time, the
Islamic world also experienced a cultural revolution: the Arabic language
and numeric systems were developed and attained dominance, 197 poetry and
philosophy flourished, 198 and the great Arabian cities were built. 199
After being fractured over several hundred years by warring princes and
the Crusades,200 the Islamic empire suffered its greatest setback during the
189 1 HODGSON, supra note 169, at 193.
190 ESACK, supra note 177, at 187-89.
191 AHMED, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169, at 14.
192 1 HODGSON, supra note 169, at 195.
193 Id. at 197.
194 GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 169, at 64; see also MOHAMED NIMER, THE NORTH
AMERICAN MUSLIM RESOURCE GUIDE 9-11 (2002).
195 JAMILA HUSSAIN, ISLAM: ITS LAW AND SOCIETY 14 (2d ed. 2004).
19 6 BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000
YEARS 83 (1995).
19 7 Id. at 68.
198 Id. at 86-87.
199 Id. at 77.
200 Id. at 88-94.
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Mongolian invasion of central Asia, Europe, and- the Middle East.201 The
"Golden Age" of Islam had passed, and even at the apex of the Ottoman
Empire, it never again enjoyed the political, religious, and social power it had
attained during the several hundred years immediately following
Muhammad's death.202
Today, although there is no unified Islamic state, the Muslim faith
dominates the Arabian Peninsula, northern Africa, south-central Asia (up to
the border of India to the east and Russia to the north), and Indonesia.20 3
About 1.3 billion people (roughly 20% of the world's population) are
Muslim, with about one-third residing in non-Muslim countries.204 Although
estimates of the number of Muslims living in the United States vary,20 5 one
authoritative source places it at 7 million.20 6 Islam is growing in America
primarily through immigration, but also as a result of a comparatively high
birth rate within the Muslim community.207 Because of current events,
especially the tragic events of September 11, 2001, awareness and interest in
Islam has increased throughout the world and especially in the United States,
which helps account for the greater quantity and quality of scholarship about
the religion. Accordingly, it is a fitting time to consider how Islam integrates
with modem American life, and in particular with American jurisprudence.
B. Sources of Moral and Legal Authority in Islam
201 Id. at 96-101. In 1206, the Mongolian prince, Genghis Khan (c. 1162-1227),
united the Mongolian tribes of northeast Asia and began a series of ruthless military
attacks that would eventually lead to the establishment of the Mongolian Empire (1206-
1368), which would become the largest contiguous empire in the history of the world.
The empire grew territorially, beginning with northern China, moving through eastern
China, central Asia, and the Slavic countries, ultimately laying claim to all of China and
parts of Europe as far west as Moscow and Kiev. See also GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note
169, at 96-98.
202 See generally GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 169, at 129-46.
203 See AMIN SAIKAL, ISLAM AND THE WEST: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?, map at x
(2003).
204 AKBAR S. AHMED, ISLAM UNDER SIEGE 7 (2003) [hereinafter AHMED, ISLAM
UNDER SIEGE].
205 One reason for the differing estimates is that the United States Bureau of the
Census is prohibited by law from compelling respondents to disclose information bearing
on their religious beliefs. 13 U.S.C. § 221(c) (2000) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of this title, no person shall be compelled to disclose information relative to his
religious beliefs or to membership in a religious body.").
206 AHMED, ISLAM UNDER SIEGE, supra note 204, at 7.
207 See Bryan S. Turner, Islam, Religious Revival and the Sovereign State, 97
MUSLIM WORLD 405, 405 (2007).
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For Muslims, the Quran is the paramount religious, moral, legal,
political, economic, and social authority;20 8 it provides an entire way of life
for man.209 Its centrality is such that Islam may be described as essentially a
"belief system with moral and practical laws that have their source in the
Qur'an."210 Muslims believe that the Quran is divinely inspired and
composed of the literal words of God.211 Reciting passages from the Quran is
a source of comfort and strength to Muslims. 212 Further, the Quran is
religiously, and even physically, revered in a way which is analogous to the
manner in which orthodox Catholics revere the relics of their saints: Muslims
usually wrap the Quran in a clean cloth and elevate it in the room, do not
point their feet at it, will not let it lie on a floor,213 and can only touch it if
they are in a state of purity.214 Newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, or other
texts containing verses of the Quran cannot be disposed of in the trash. 215
Besides the Quran, Muslims regard with great reverence the sunnah-the
way Muhammad lived his life: his customs, deeds, and practices, which are
considered to be "a tangible form and the actual embodiment of the Will of
[God]." 216 In addition to the sunnah, reverence is given to the hadith,2 17 or
narrations about the life of Muhammad, his words and sayings, along with
the verbal approval or disapproval he gave to the words and actions of
others. 218 Although Muslims do not believe that the dictates of the sunnah
208 See AHMED, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169, at 28-29 ("the Quran is the message
of God.... [its] messages cover all aspects of life"); SAEED, supra note 183, at 15.
2 0 9 
'ALLAMAH SAYYID M.H. TABATABA'I, THE QUR'AN IN ISLAM: ITS IMPACT AND
INFLUENCE ON THE LIFE OF MUSLIMS 17 (1987).
210 Id.
211 SAEED, supra note 183, at 15.
212 AHMED, ISLAM TODAY, supra note 169, at 32.
213 Id.
214 7 SHAYKH 'ABDUL-'AZIZ BIN 'ABDULLAH BIN BAz, SHAYKH MUHAMMAD BIN
SALIH AL-'UTHAIMIN & SHAYKH 'ABDULLAH BIN 'ABDUR-RAHMAN AL-JIBREEN,
FATAWA ISLAMIYAH: ISLAMIC VERDICTS 16 (Muhammad bin 'Abdul-'Aziz Al-
Musnad ed., 2002) [hereinafter "AI-Musnad, ISLAMIC VERDICTS"].
2 1 5 Id
216 1 SAHM MUSLIM ix (Abdul Hamid Siddiqi trans., 1972).
217 "Like the Qur'an, the ahadith (singular: hadith) were originally written and have
been preserved in Arabic. Ismail al-Bukhari's compilation of ahadith is considered the
most authoritative collection." Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions
Under Title VII: How Muslims Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(J),
2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 497, 501 n.23 (2007).
218 1 SAHIH MUSLIM, supra note 216, at ix. The belief that Muhammad was the
Prophet of God includes the belief that Muhammad was inspired not only in the recitation
of the Quran but also in all that he did and said. See ESACK, supra note 177, at 36 ("Most
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and hadith are revealed by God in the same way as is the Quran, they
nevertheless assign a profound moral and religious authority to these
works.219 The teaching of the scholars and jurists who followed
Muhammad's death is also given considerable weight. 220 This source of
Islamic law-ytihad-reflects their attempt to formulate a legal opinion that
applies God's law to particular circumstances. 221 Although ijtihad are only
probable applications of God's law, they nevertheless carry significant legal
authority.222 A consensus by Muslim scholars and jurists on a certain issue is
referred to as Yma and must be followed.2 23 These teachings, together with
the sunnah, hadith, and the Quran, constitute the heart of Islamic law, which
is commonly known as shariah.224 Linguistically, shariah is associated with
words such as "the path," "the way," or "the road. '225 Considered within the
context of Islamic law, shariah is the divine guidance provided by the Quran,
the sunnah, hadith, and authoritative interpretations of these sources, which
are generally expressed in commands and prohibitions-it is, therefore, "the
path to be followed. '226
Muslims hold that Muhammad was born and lived out his mission in the broad daylight
of history and that details of his life are encapsulated in the body of knowledge known as
the Sirah, which has also acquired the status of sacred history.").
219 There has been, and to some extent still is, a dispute within the Muslim
community regarding what are the "true" hadith. Nevertheless, a true hadith will always
satisfy the following conditions: (1) it cannot contradict the Quran or be contrary to
reason, nature, experience, or accepted traditions; (2) it cannot praise any individual tribe,
person, or place; (3) it cannot detail or date future events; and, (4) it cannot be
inconsistent with the principle that Muhammad is the Prophet of God. See HUSSAIN,
supra note 195, at 33-34.
220 Id. at 34.
221 Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur'an and the Constitution: Similarities in the
Use of Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO
L. REv. 67, 69-70 (2006).
222 Id. at 70-71.
223 SAEED, supra note 183, at 49. A fourth source of law for the Sunni schools is
qiyas, or reasoning by analogy performed by Muslim jurists to address various situations
individuals and societies encounter. A comprehensive treatment of the various schools of
Islamic thought is beyond the scope of this Article. For further discussion, see id. at 43-
83.
224 HUSSAIN, supra note 195, at 33-34; see also SAEED, supra note 183, at 44-45.
The teachings and rulings of scholars and jurists examining the Quran and sunnah and the
principles therein came to be known asfiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence. Shariah in modem
terms refers "generally to the commands and prohibitions not just as they are found in the
Qur'an and Sunna but as they have been interpreted and elaborated in fiqh to be acted
upon in everyday life. Therefore these terms are often used interchangeably."
225 SAEED, supra note 183, at 43.
226 Id. at 43, 45.
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The role of shariah in the modem Islamic state is problematic. On the
one hand, shariah is a guide for Muslims in all aspects of their life, private
and public. 227 On the other hand, shariah is not an essentially political or
legal body of authority, and its validity extends only to Muslims.
Accordingly, fitting shariah into the systems of a modem non-Muslim state
presents profound theoretical difficulties, especially when one considers how
shariah can, might, or should co-exist with a highly developed and secular
legal system, such as is found in the United States. For the purposes of this
Article, therefore, shariah will be examined not in its relevance to political
and legal systems, but only insofar as it is a general moral guide for
Muslims.228
C. Teachings on Truth, Lying, and Giving Witness in Islam
A fundamental moral imperative of the Quran is that Muslims must be
truthful. The Quran expressly wams Muslims that God is "well aware" if
they "conceal the truth or evade it."'229 Moreover, it instructs Muslims to "say
the straightforward word"230 and to "[b]e always just"231 because God
227 Id. at 45 ("[Shari 'a] is a religious notion of law, one in which law is an integral
aspect of religion. In fact religion to a Muslim is essentially the Divine Law which
includes not only universal moral principles but details of how man should conduct his
life and deal with his neighbor and with God; how he should eat, procreate, and sleep;
how he should buy and sell at the market place; how he should pray and perform other
acts of worship"); see also Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in
Liberal Democracies, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1525, 1526 (1996) (emphasizing the
importance of shariah by quoting Muslim jurist, Muhammad Ibn Qayyim: "Every good
in this life is derived from [shariah] and achieved through it ... [it] is the pillar of
existence and key to success in this world and the Hereafter.").
228 It must be remembered, however, that for Muslims shariah is more than merely a
body of moral or religious instructions that can peacefully co-exist with a developed
political and legal system. In its fullest sense, shariah represents an ideal to which the
"Muslim state" must aspire.
229 QURAN 4:135. All quotes from the Quran are from THE HOLY QuR'AN (Islam
Int'l Publ'ns Ltd., 1988) [five volume series]. Each chapter of the Quran, except the
Bara'at, begins with the verse, "In the name of [God], the Gracious, the Merciful." THE
HOLY QUR'AN series translation considers the aforesaid verse as the first verse of each
chapter. Most translations of the Quran do not denote this as the first verse. This results in
a discrepancy between the numbering of verses; e.g., verse 136 in THE HOLY QUR'AN
series translation would be verse 135 in most other translations. Although this Article will
use the translation of THE HOLY QUR'AN series, the citations to verse numbers will follow
that of the majority of other translations of the Quran.
230 Id. at 33:70. The commentary on this passage from 4 T1 HOLY QUR'AN, supra
note 229, at 2137, indicates that this particular Surah pertains to among the most
important laws for Muslims to follow, calling them to be always "scrupulously
straightforward in dealings with other people."
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"guides not one who exceeds the bounds and is a great liar."232 Those who
tell lies and bear false witness are categorized with unbelievers and
hypocrites as li 'an (cursed), who are to be deprived of God's blessings. 233
Although the Quran instructs Muslims to be truthful, there are two
elements from Islamic tradition which suggest that Muslims might be
permitted to lie in limited circumstances. The first pertains to an
understanding of the scope of Islamic sovereignty. While some Islamic
scholars hold that the world is one abode under Islamic jurisprudence and
contemporary international law, others recognize a basic division into zones
of peace and belligerency. 234 For them, the world is comprised of two
spheres: dar al-Islam ("house of Islam" or "house of peace"), which contains
all lands under Muslim rule, and dar al-Harb ("house of war"), which
contains all lands outside Muslim rule.235 Consistent with this belief, it might
be argued that Muslims residing in dar al-Islam live in a state of constant
conflict 236 with the citizens of dar al-Harb, and thus the rules that govern
relations among Muslims do not necessarily apply to interactions between
Muslims and others in dar al-Harb.237 Hence, it has been reported that
Muslim theologian Abdi Bakr al-Bdqilldni contends that a Muslim would be
permitted to lie if he feared for his safety while in dar al-Harb.238
According to progressive Muslim scholarship, however, the fundamental
distinction between dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb, when it is defined
politically and used to justify militant jihadist aggression, is contrary to the
principles of Islam.239 A Muslim thus would not be permitted to rely on this
231 QuRAN 5:8.
232 Id. at 40:28.
233 In Islam, i'an is the most derogatory word. ALLAMA SYED SULAIMAN NADwI,
SIRATuN NABI: ETHICS IN ISLAM 359 (Rizwan Uddin Ahmad & Haji Muhammad Aslam
trans., 1999).
234 Sheikh Wahbeh al-Zuhili, Islam and International Law, 87 INT'L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS 258, 278, available at http://www.icrc.orgWeb/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/review-858-p269/$File/irrc_858 Zuhili.pdf.
235 MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 162-63 (1984). This
distinction does not appear in the Quran or sunnah, but it was posited by early Muslim
scholars and theologians.
236 Although this "state of conflict could" entail physical warfare, it also embraces
other Islamic principles, such as spreading the Muslim religion. See id. at 164-65.
237 A branch of Muslim law, Siyar, developed to govern relations between dar al-
Islam and dar al-Harb. See id. at 164.
238 Id. at 163.
23 9 MUHAMMAD SA'ID AL-'ASHMAWY, AGAINST ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 111-12
(Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban ed., 1998) ("militants believe wrongly that Muhammad's path
and message have abrogated any other paths.. . maintain[ing] that jihad means to impose
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belief in order to justify departing from the fundamental moral tenets of
Islam. Moreover, even under the most traditional understanding of the
division between dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb, a Muslim's general duties
toward God would remain constant. 240 Accordingly, the narrow set of
circumstances in which a Muslim might be permitted to lie based on this
rationale almost certainly does not to pertain to the Muslim living in the
United States today.
The second element in Islamic tradition stems from a hadith in which
Muhammad condoned lying in three circumstances:
Humaid b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Auf reported that his mother Umm Kulthum
daughter of 'Uqba b. Abu Mu'ait, and she was one amongst the first
emigrants who pledged allegiance to Allah's Apostle (may peace be upon
him), as saying that she heard Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him)
as saying: A liar is not one who tries to bring reconciliation amongst people
and speaks good (in order to avert dispute), or he conveys good. Ibn Shihab
said he did not hear that exemption was granted in anything what the people
speak as lie but in three cases: in battle, for bringing reconciliation amongst
persons and the narration of the words of the husband to his wife, and the
narration of the words of a wife to her husband (in a twisted form in order
to bring reconciliation between them).24 1
The three narrow circumstances in which lying might be permissible for
Muslims are themselves further circumscribed. 242 Concerning lying in battle,
"[a]ccording to the renowned Shafi'i jurist, an-Nawawi . . . there is a
Islam on the infidels at any time and anywhere, to convert them to the right path and true
faith.... [this] is not jihd but aggression, forbidden by the verses and the very spirit of
the Qur'dn.... The one-sided stress placed on holy wars and fighting is a historical
distortion of the real concept ofjihad and is due to political interests."); see also MALISE
RUTHvEN, ISLAM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 145 (1997) ("With globalization
eroding the classic distinction between dar al-islam [sic] and dar al-harb [sic] the
coming decades are likely to see a retreat from direct political action and a renewed
emphasis on the personal and private aspects of faith.").
240 VIKOR, supra note 179, at 280-81 n. 1.
241 SAHIH MUSLIM 32:6303 (Abdul Hamid Siddiqui trans.), available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/muslim/032.smt.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2007). For a complete collection of the SAHIH MUSLIM, see University of
Southern California Compendium of Muslim Texts, available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/muslim/.
242 But cf CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 45, at 2475-87
(prohibiting lying under all circumstances, but indicating that there must be an intention
to deceive or lead another person into error). See generally PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, LYING: AN
AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF DUPLICITY (2004) (providing a broad historical discussion
of lying); 10 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 195-96 (1913) (containing a discussion of
the concept of mental reservation).
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consensus among Islamic scholars that allows for tricks in war against
unbelievers, unless they have been given a promise or guarantee. '243 Thus,
an oath or promise limits this possibility during time of war because an oath
is never to be violated.244 Concerning the last two circumstances, lying for
the sake of reconciliation between persons or spouses may only be done
when there is a legitimate need for reconciliation. 245 For Muhammad, one's
intention is the foundation of whether an action is moral or immoral.246
Therefore, lying is permissible only in these exceptional situations, provided
one intends to bring about the necessary reconciliation of persons and not
simply to lie.
The few situations in which lying is permitted, however, should not
overshadow the fundamental requirement that Muslims must be truthful in
their words and actions. When Muhammad was asked what would lead
people to paradise, he replied:
Telling of truth is a virtue and virtue leads to Paradise and the servant who
endeavours to tell the truth is recorded as truthful, and lie is obscenity and
obscenity leads to Hell-Fire, and the servant who endeavours to tell a lie is
recorded as a liar. Ibn Abu Shaiba reported this from Allah's Apostle (may
peace be upon him).247
Further, when Muhammad was questioned about major sins, he
identified shirk (polytheism) 248 and disobeying parents. He then quickly
added "false evidence" or "false speech," and he repeated it so many times
that his companions wanted him to stop saying it.2 49 According to
Muhammad's companions (Sahabah), "nothing was more hateful to the
Prophet than a lie. If a person had lied while being in [the] presence of the
Prophet, he would have suffered its pain until his repentance." 250 This
243 Karima Bennoune, Note, As-Salamu 'Alaykum? Humanitarian Law in Islamic
Jurisprudence, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 605, 625 (1994).
244 Id.; see also QURAN 16:91.
245 Sami Zaatari, Examining the Issue of the Prophet Muhammad Allowing Muslims
to Lie, available at http://muslim-responses.com/Islam-on Lying/ Islam-onLying_; see
also Uthmaan Dhumayriyyah', Truthfulness, http://www.alminbar.com/
khutbaheng/293.htm.
2 4 6 NADWI, supra note 233, at 50.
247 SAHIH MUSLIM 32:6308, supra note 241, available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fimdamentals/hadithsunnah/muslim/032.smt.html.
248 See infra notes 265-68, and accompanying text.
249 NADWI, supra note 233, at 364.
2 5 0 MAULANA ABDUS SALAM NADvI, THE WAYS OF THE SAHABAH (COMPANIONS OF
THE PROPHET) 236 (Muhammad Younus Qureshi trans., 2000).
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disapproval of lying was not limited to Muhammad alone; his followers held
lying in such contempt that if someone charged one of them with lying, the
accused liar would mourn because the accusation itself reflected he had a bad
moral character.25'
Thus, in shariah, one must not have a character of falsehood, or he will
be considered a hypocrite and will be without the blessings of God.252
According to Muhammad, "[t]he signs of a hypocrite are three: 1) Whenever
he speaks, he tells a lie. 2) Whenever he promises, he always breaks it (his
promise). 3) If you trust him, he proves to be dishonest (if you keep
something as a trust with him, he will not return it)."'253 This character of
falsehood or hypocrisy leads to infidelity, which closes the door to salvation
for Muslims. 254
Besides addressing truth and lying, shariah also teaches specifically
about giving witness and taking oaths. In the Quran, Muslims are told to
"plead not on behalf of those who are dishonest to themselves" 255 and to "be
strict in observing justice, and be witnesses for [God], even though it be
against yourselves or against parents and kindred. '256 Only those who "bear
not false witness" 257 are considered a true servant of God.258 Refraining from
bearing false witness259 has been interpreted to apply to two areas: 1)
Muslims are instructed not to give evidence in a court of law "in regard to a
false thing in order to prove it right, when in fact it is a falsehood, or at best a
doubtful thing"; and 2) they must "have no intention to witness any thing
251 Id.
252 NADWI, supra note 233, at 359.
253 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI 1:2:32 (Muhammad Muhsin Khan trans.), available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/002.sbt.html#001.002
.032 (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). For a complete collection of the SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, see
University of Southern California Compendium of Muslim Texts,
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/.
254 "No believer has been accursed for any action except falsehood." NADWI, supra
note 233, at 359.
255 QuRAN 4:107.
256 Id. at 4:135; see also 2 THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 228, at 571 n.600
(commenting that this verse instructs that "one should give true evidence in all cases,
even against the members of one's own community or one's near relations or even when
one's own honour or property is at stake.").
257 QURAN 25:72.
258 Id. at 25:63.
259 In Islam, a lie which is detrimental to the rights and honor of others is
distinguished from a common falsehood because it is considered the worst kind of lie. It
is referred to as zur (to stray from the straight path). Although the meaning of zur
includes "falsehood and calumny, it does appear from hadiths that it particularly means
false evidence." NADWI, supra note 233, at 363-64.
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which is false, evil or wicked as spectators. In this sense, every sin and every
indecency, every sham and counterfeit act is a falsehood. A true servant of
[God] recognizes it as false and shuns it .. ".. 260 Shariah also permits
women to give testimony where such testimony will "establish the truth."'261
Moreover, faithful Muslims are instructed that they should "make not
your oaths a means of deceit between you; or your foot will slip after it has
been firmly established, and you will taste evil because you turned people
away from the path of [God], and you will have a severe punishment. 262
The solemnity in taking an oath is reflected by the requirement that oaths
only be taken in the name of God.263 It is not permissible for a Muslim to
take an oath swearing by Muhammad or anyone else.264 In fact, if anyone
swears by other than God, he has committed an act of shirk.265 Shirk is the
gravest of sins and is considered unpardonable. 266 Shirk is committed
anytime one implies that there are partners or equals to God, or ascribes
"divine attributes to others besides [God] and believing that the source of
power, harm and blessings comes from another besides [God]. 267
Muhammad also equated giving false witness with the sin of shirk.268
Although the above-quoted verses from the Quran and instructions from
various hadith indicate that Muslims should observe their oaths and not bear
false witness, there exist other, seemingly contradictory verses. For instance,
the Quran instructs:
2 6 0 S. ABUL A'LA MAUD.DI, 8 THE MEANING OF THE QUR'AN 206 ('Abdul 'Az-z
Kamal trans., 1991).
261 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN ISLAM 68
(2002).
262 QURAN 16:95. It is interesting to note that the commentary in 3 THE HOLY
QuR'AN, supra note 229, at 1379, indicates that not only are dishonest motives
unrighteous, but Muslims in particular should refrain from dishonest conduct, "even
though it be in political affairs" because it "will make men turn away from Islam." See
also 6 MAUDODI, supra note 260, at 97.
263 SAHIH AL-BUKHARI 8:78:641, supra note 253, available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/078.sbt.html. Oaths
must be observed since God is invoked as a guarantor of the oath-taker. QURAN 16:92.
264 SAHIH AL-BuKHARI 8:78:641-43, supra note 253, available at
http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/078.sbt.html.
265 6 Al-Musnad, ISLAMIC VERDICTS, supra note 214, at 367.
2 6 6 IGNAZ GOLDHIZER, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 42 (Andras
Hamori & Ruth Hamori trans., 1981).
267 MUHAMMAD TAQT-UD-DiN AL-HILAL, MUHAMMAD MUHSIN KHAN,
INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANINGS OF THE NOBLE QUR'AN IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 1994).
268 3 SuNAN ABU DAWUD 1022,28:3592 (Ahmad Hasan trans., 1984).
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And make not [God] a target for your oaths that you may thereby abstain
from doing good and acting righteously and making peace between men...
[God] will not call you to account for such of your oaths as are vain, but He
will call you to account for what your hearts have eamed.2 69
Here, however, the Quran is referring to men who become angry with
their wives and swear oaths that they will not treat them well. 270 Muslims are
elsewhere instructed to refrain from doing anything that is vain or
purposeless, 27 1 and the oaths referenced in this verse have been sworn by
men purely out of habit, because of anger, or in a careless manner without
reflection.2 72 Such "oaths" lack adequate thought and thus do not have legal
effect,2 73 and Muhammad would often overlook oaths that were made
casually or purely out of habit.2
74
On the other hand, deliberate oaths-that is, oaths with a proper
intention 275 in one's heart and awareness-must be observed.2 76 Indeed,
some Muslim scholars and jurists teach that simulating an oath by
deliberately making a false oath for material gain or to appease someone is
too grave a sin for atonement. 277 The notion of atonement or expiation for
breaking an oath is found in the following verse:
God will not call you to account for such of your oaths as are vain, but He
will call you to account for the oaths which you take in eamest. Its
expiation, then, is the feeding of ten poor persons with such average food as
you feed your families with, or the clothing of them or the freeing of a neck.
But whoso finds not the means shall fast for three days. That is the
269 QuRAN 2:224-25.
270 2 THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 229, at 294.
271 QuRAN 23:3.
272 2 THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 229, at 294.
273 Id.; see also 1 MAUDUDI, supra note 260, at 163 ("[hf anyone takes a
thoughtless oath to do or not to do a thing and afterwards realizes that faimess demands
its abrogation, he should abrogate it and expiate for it.").
274 SAYYID QuTH, 1 IN THE SHADE OF THE QURAN 275 (M.A. Salahi & A.A. Shamis
eds. & trans., 1999).
275 Muhammad judged an action as good or evil based on the intention of the actor.
NADwI, supra note 233, at 50. In shariah, because one's intention is the foundation of the
morality of an action, one must be aware of what he is doing in order for the oath to be
binding; thus, only a "deliberate" oath is an oath in a strict sense.
276 QURAN 16:91.
277 1 QuTH, supra note 274, at 275.
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expiation of your oaths when you have sworn them. And do keep your
oaths. 278
The instruction to expiate for oaths is not explicit permission to break
oaths with impunity and then make atonement for them afterward. 279 The
oaths referred to in this verse involve designating certain lawful foods to be
unlawful for the oath takers. 280 Such an oath is considered sinful for
Muslims, and therefore ought to be broken because Muslims cannot make
unlawful food which God made lawful.281 Thus, if a Muslim without
deliberation made an oath such as this, he is not bound to observe it. On the
other hand, if a Muslim deliberately takes such an oath, he ought to expiate
for breaking it, even though the oath was sinful, because of his original
intention and deliberate taking of an oath.282 Deliberation and awareness
imply three requirements: (1) Muslims should not make oaths for worthless
or sinful purposes; (2) if a Muslim takes an oath, he has an obligation to
remember it; and (3) if a Muslim deliberately takes a valid oath that is not
sinful in itself, he must fulfill it.283 The deliberateness of an oath and
emphasis of its gravity can be manifested in several ways: (1) by the wording
of the oath, such as including names of God, which calls to mind in the oath-
taker the punishment for contradicting the oath; (2) by the time when the oath
is taken, such as after prayer; (3) by the place in which the oath is taken; (4)
by the position the person is in when taking the oath, such as standing; and
(5) by the consequences connected with breaking it.284
Another easily misunderstood verse from the Quran concerns dissolving
oaths: "[God] has indeed allowed to you dissolution of your oaths, and [God]
is your Friend; and He is All-Knowing, Wise." 28 5 In this verse, Muhammad
had made an oath to refrain from using certain lawful amenities 28 6 because of
his wives' insistent demands that he procure them.28 7 Similar to verse 5:90,
this passage indicates that not even Muhammad had the power to make
278 QuRAN 5:90.
279 2 THE HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 229, at 649.
280 3 MAUDUDI, supra note 260, at 70.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 6 Al-Musnad, ISLAMIC VERDICTS, supra note 214, at 365-66.
285 QURAN 66:2.
286 It is speculated that Muhammad had made an oath not to eat honey. See 14
MAUDUDI, supra note 260, at 379.
287 5 THE HOLY QuR'AN, supra note 229, at 2649.
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unlawful those things which God had made lawful. 288 Muhammad did not
regard this oath as forbidding something "as a matter of faith nor legally. '289
Hence, telling the truth, giving truthful testimony in court, and fulfilling
deliberate oaths are moral imperatives for the faithful Muslim.290 Failure to
be honest in one's private and public affairs bears the likely consequence of
eternal condemnation. Moreover, although shariah properly belongs to an
Islamic state, faithful Muslims in America consider themselves equally
bound by its moral imperatives, at least insofar as they are compatible with
America's secular legal traditions. 291 Accordingly, with respect to truth-
telling and giving testimony, faithful Muslims living in the United States are
constrained by the religious instructions contained in shariah just as their
brethren living in Muslim countries are bound by them.292
D. Muslims and Oath-Taking: Political and Legal Contexts
Perhaps as a result of the increasing democratization of Middle Eastern
countries,293 oaths in these nations are used in many of the same ways as in
the West. In several Muslim states, for example, government officials take an
oath prior to assuming office;294 cadets take an oath upon graduation from
288 14 MAUDUDI, supra note 260, at 376.
289 Id.
290 The inviolability and reverence that Muslims have for an oath, particularly in
court, is shown by a study of courts in Islamic Morocco, where "it was found that lying
litigants would frequently 'maintain their testimony right up to the moment of oath-taking
and then to stop, refuse the oath, and surrender the case."' Michael J. Frank, Trying
Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, 18 FLA. J.
INT.'L L. 1, 83 (2006).
291 KAMALI, supra note 261, at 4 ("For the common practicing Muslim [in North
America], the essentials of the faith remain the most important issues in their religious
life.").
292 Fadl, supra note 227, at 1529.
293 For perspectives on the character, development and processes of democracy in
Middle Eastern countries, see generally DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
EXPERIENCES, STRUGGLES, CHALLENGES (Amin Saikal & Albrecht Schnabel, eds., 2003).
294 Examples of constitutions that require taking an oath prior to assuming office
are: Iran (see QANUNi AsSASSI JUMHIRI'I ISLA'MAI IRAN [Constitution] art. 121 1358);
Iraq (see AL-DusTuRAL-'IR-AQ-I [Constitution] arts. 48, 68, 76); Jordan (see CONST. OF
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN art. 29); Kuwait (see CONST. KUWAIT art. 60);
Qatar (see QATAR CONST. arts. 10, 13, 74, 92, 116, 119); Syria (see CONST. OF THE
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC art. 7); United Arab Emiriates (see DASTOR DAWLAT AL-
IMARAT AL-'ARABIYA AL-MUTrALIDA [Constitution] arts. 52, 57, 73, 98); Yemen (see
YEMEN CONST. arts. 75, 108, 111, 132, 159).
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military academies; 295 and healthcare professionals, viewed as "instruments
of God's mercy on earth," 296 take an oath affirming the sacredness of their
duty to serve mankind.297
In the Islamic law of evidence, the oath is more than a procedural
guarantor of testimony; it is also a substantive, evidentiary tool that can
fortify or detract from a litigant's case. Accordingly, if a plaintiff has
insufficient evidence to support his claim, he may request that the defendant
take an oath declaring his innocence. If the defendant refuses to take the oath,
that refusal can be used as evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff;298 if
he takes the oath, it may be used as evidence to render judgment for the
defendant.299 Although Muslims are not required to take such oaths on the
Quran, many do, presumably to buttress the strength of their testimony. 300
Telling the truth under oath, regardless of whether the Quran is used, is a
grave moral imperative. 301
295 See, e.g., Leader Attends Graduation and Oath-Taking Ceremony at Imam Ali
Military Academy, THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION CULTURAL-RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR
PRESERVING AND PUBLISHING WORKS BY AYATOLLAH SEYYED ALl KHAMENIE, Dec. 24,
2006, available at http://www.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com-content&task
=view&id=352&Itemid=2.
296 FARHAT MOAZAM, BIOETHICS AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION IN A MUSLIM
SOCIETY: A STUDY IN CULTURE, ETHNOGRAPHY, AND RELIGION 218 (2006).
297 Id. at 240-41 n.7.
298 HUSSAIN, supra note 195, at 165.
299 Id. at 166 (Referring to a March 1996 article in the Malaysian Law News,
Hussain reports of a case in Malaysia in which a man, accused of rape, took an oath in the
presence of the Imam of the mosque, the judge, the prosecutor, the solicitor, and the
victim's mother. He was acquitted on the grounds that his oath raised a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.). See supra note 27, and accompanying text, concerning decisory oaths, of
which this is an example.
300 HUSSAIN, supra note 195, at 165-66.
301 A comprehensive, comparative study of oath taking as it bears on the Muslim's
relation to the State is beyond the scope of this Article. A few examples are instructive,
however. In Turkey, a secular democratic State, oaths in criminal trials are administered
not on sacred artifacts (such as the Quran or the Bible), but on one's honor. See Ergun
Ozsunay, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or
Belief in Turkey, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1087, 1118 (2005). In Greece, Muslims must
take oaths on the Quran when required by law, during military service, or when elected as
deputies. See Secretary-General, Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, § 1 (Greece), Report prepared pursuant to
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/72 (1993).
The Algerian Constitution mandates that when taking the oath of office, "the President
must swear by Allah to respect and glorify the Islamic religion." Joelle Entelis,
International Human Rights: Islam's Friend or Foe?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1251, 1274
(1997).
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Further, many Muslim-Americans freely participate in American state
and societal institutions in which the oath is an integral part. For example, it
is estimated that ten thousand Muslims serve in the various branches of the
United States military,30 2 enlistment in which requires taking an oath to
"support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies. '30 3 In addition, in United States courts, as discussed above,304
witnesses must take an oath or affirmation prior to giving testimony, and
Muslims generally have freely participated in this requirement. Recently, the
Attorney General required certain nonimmigrant aliens, mostly from Muslim
countries, to report to Immigration and Naturalization Service to be
photographed, fingerprinted, and interviewed under oath regarding why they
were in the United States,30 5 and presumably most Muslims complied with
these requirements. These examples illustrate that the oath is regarded by
Muslim-Americans in essentially the same way that non-Muslim Americans
regard it: as a mode of publicly guaranteeing the truthfulness of one's
testimony.
In summary, telling the truth is an important, universal moral principle of
Islam. When sealed by an oath, particularly on the Quran, the importance of
telling the truth attains a heightened significance, for such an oath sworn on
the Quran gives witness to the declarant's willingness to stake his eternal
destination on the truthfulness of his testimony. 30 6 Accordingly, taking an
oath generally, and in particular securing an oath by the Quran, rises to at
least the same level of significance for a Muslim-American as taking an oath
302 Many Muslims have honorably performed their military duties in campaigns
against Middle Eastern countries. See NIMER, supra note 194, at 15. Nimer notes that
although some Muslim servicemen have claimed conscientious objection, such as boxer
Muhammad Ali during the Vietnam war, many participated in the 1990-91 Gulf War
against Iraq.
303 10 U.S.C. § 502 (2000) ("Each person enlisting in an armed force shall take the
following oath: 'I, _ , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President
of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to
regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.').
304 See supra Part III.
305 See Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries,
Att'y Gen. Order No. 2643-2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 2363 (Jan. 16, 2003).
306 The gravity of making a deliberately false oath while swearing on the Quran is of
the most serious kind. If one swears to a lie while using the Quran and knows it, "this is a
great sin for which he must turn in repentance to Allah. Indeed, some of the scholars say
that this is a false oath, which submerges the perpetrator into itself, and then he will be
submerged in the Fire." Al-Musnad, ISLAMIC VERDICTS, supra note 214, at 405.
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on the Bible does for a Christian-American, or making an affirmation does
for one who does not wish to guarantee his oath on a holy artifact.
V. THE BIBLE, QURAN, AND RELIGIOUS ARTIFACTS
IN AMERICAN COURTS
In light of the religious pluralism present within the United States today,
it is appropriate to consider the content of oaths and oath ceremonies in
contemporary American courts, and in particular whether religious artifacts
such as the Bible and Quran should be permitted. This evaluation requires an
analysis of four issues: (1) What is the purpose and significance of oaths in
modem American society?; (2) Is it acceptable to use the Bible, the Quran,
and other religious artifacts in oath taking in light of the relevant common
law and statutory provisions?; (3) Is it necessary for Christians to use the
Bible, for Muslims to use the Quran, and for adherents of other religious
traditions to use sacred artifacts in oath taking?; and (4) What are the relative
advantages and disadvantages of allowing the use of such artifacts for this
purpose?
A. The Purpose and Significance of Oaths in Modern American
Society
Cultures change, and American society is no exception. Human nature is
transcendent, however, and an important aspect of the human person is a
desire to know the truth.307 While a yearning and inclination for the truth and
knowledge endures, no society has successfully cultivated the virtue of
truthfulness in all its citizens, a reality which is attributable to the human
condition. Accordingly, the historical purpose of an oath as a guarantor of
truth to promote justice remains relevant in present-day America. As one
court recently put it, the continued "purpose of the oath requirement is to
impress upon the affiant the solemnity of the occasion and the need to tell the
truth."308
Of course, the use of oaths and affirmations in modem American courts
is not directed at promoting the virtue of truthfulness for the sake of
perfecting a witness' character. Rather, an oath or affirmation is meant "to
bind the conscience of the speaker at a time when what he says will deeply
affect the rights of an individual. '30 9 In other words, the witness oath or
affirmation has a fundamental civic purpose of helping to achieve right order
307 See Milhizer, supra note 11, at 59-63.
308 State v. Robinson, 518 S.E.2d 269, 275 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
309 Brummer v. Stokebrand, 601 N.W.2d 619, 623 (S.D. 1999).
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and justice within society by promoting truth so that no one is stigmatized or
deprived of legitimate rights or liberty based on false testimony. The oath has
thus retained its status as "an essential component of . . . legal
proceedings." 310
Although the basic reasons and relevance of oaths in our legal system
have remained constant, their foundational premise has changed over time as
a consequence of a cultural transformation in America from Christian
homogeneity to religious diversity. Notwithstanding the contention that
American society has become more irreligious, the American people have
retained a sense that they are bound to follow their consciences, which for
most of us is linked to God in some manner.311 And so, for the oath taker, the
modem understanding of an oath's potency resides in its capacity to awaken
one's conscience and reinforce one's duty to be truthful through a divine
invocation, rather than its ability to summon supernatural intervention or
even divine retribution should one lie. Moreover, even those who still hold
interventionist beliefs would join in the contemporary consensus that an oath
awakens the taker's conscience and reinforces his duty to tell the truth. This
is the substance of the modem oath.
Given the religious diversity in contemporary America, an effective oath
must account for a variety of beliefs about the identity and nature of God,
consistent with present-day attitudes. It must permit subjective and divergent
understandings of God's relationship to an oath and an oath taker. It must
accommodate religious diversity, both as publicly expressed in the oath
ceremony and as privately held by individual oath takers. Finally, it must
retain is substantive meaning while demonstrating procedural agility. These
are the needs and challenges of the modem oath.312
In addition, oaths and oath ceremonies have continued significance for
persons besides oath takers. For fact-finders and the broader public, witness
oaths are important because they can "remedy ... a defect, namely, some
man's lack of belief in another man." 313 An invocation of "God" as part of an
oath helps satisfy others that the oath taker's conscience has at least
presumptively been awakened to the duty to tell the truth. This assurance
rests on a common understanding that one who believes in God would not lie
310 State v. Tye, 636 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Wis. 2001).
311 A Gallup poll in 1988 revealed that eight in ten Americans thought they would
be called before God on Judgment Day to give an account of their sins; a 1994 Harris poll
indicated that 95% of Americans believe in God. Thomas C. Reeves, Not So Christian
America, 66 FIRST THINGS 16 (1996).
312 Federal Rule 603 provides that no particular form of oath is required. See FED. R.
EVlD. 603 Advisory Committee Notes. Accordingly, the Federal Rule allows for the
adoption of appropriate oaths without specifying any specific oath.
313 AQUINAS, supra note 9, H-II, Q. 89, Art. 5.
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when invoking God, especially in a formal setting and about significant
matters. The objective value of the oath for society complements its
subjective value for oath takers. Because oaths continue to serve both
functions effectively-in fact, because they most powerfully serve these
functions for most people-they have retained their relevance and potency in
modem American society.
B. The Acceptability of Using the Bible, Quran, and Other Religious
Artifacts in Courtroom Oaths
Although a non-specific invocation of God in an oath has continuing
importance, it remains to consider whether the use of religious artifacts
during oath ceremonies is still acceptable in contemporary courtrooms.
Consistent with the relevant common law and statutory law principles, it
seems entirely permissible to allow Christians to use the Bible, Muslims to
use the Quran, and believers from other faith traditions to use various
artifacts and objects when taking a witness oath in American courts.
Over two centuries ago, Omychund v. Barker established that an oath
taker should be permitted to swear an oath using a form that he finds binding
on his conscience. 314 Consistent with this reasoning, if an oath taker believes
that a religious artifact is necessary or helpful in this way, its use would be
deemed beneficial for this limited purpose. Accordingly, American courts
have historically permitted a variety of religious artifacts and other objects to
be employed while taking an oath, including chickens, burning sticks, and
tribal icons. 315 As one court instructed:
And if our form of oath is not binding upon persons of other religious
beliefs, the form which is recognized as binding can be administered. A Jew
may be sworn on the Pentateuch or Old Testament, with his head covered; a
Mohammedan on the Koran; a Gentoo, touching with his hand the foot of a
Brahmin or priest of his religion; a Chinese, by breaking a china saucer. 316
Consistent with this approach, sacred texts from all faith traditions
should be equally welcomed.
This historic tolerance of alternative oath practices seems to have been
preserved in most contemporary statutory provisions. As noted earlier, there
314 Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 31 (K.B.) (opinion of Lord Chief
Justice Willes); id. at 33 (opinion of the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke).
315 See supra notes 68-72.
316 United States v. Miller, 236 F. 798, 799-800 (W.D.Wa. 1916); see also United
States v. Mallard, 40 F. 151, 151 (D.C.S.C. 1889) (holding that "[t]he oath may be
administered on the Book, or with uplifted hand, or in any mode peculiar to the religious
belief of the person sworn, or in any form binding on his conscience").
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is presently no required constitutional or federal statutory form for witness
oaths.317 The overriding concern in the federal system is that the oath binds
the witness in conscience and raises the witness' awareness of his duty to tell
the truth.318 Many state statutory provisions likewise accommodate the use of
various religious articles, presumably to help accomplish these same
goals.319 Such provisions would seem to allow a witness to take oaths using
any artifact he considers sacred, and, perhaps, they would even tolerate the
use of any object that the witness finds to have religious significance.
The special status of the Bible for Christians and the Quran for Muslims
make these texts especially suitable for oath ceremonies. Christians believe
the Bible is the inspired word of God, worthy of the most solemn veneration;
they believe it teaches the truth by revealing divine realities, and it offers
strength and guidance for daily life. 320 Analogously, for Muslims the Quran
is the paramount authority, which teaches how one should live every aspect
of his life.321 The Quran is understood by Muslims to be the word of God and
to symbolize the demands of shariah: that one must be truthful, must not
bear false witness, must refrain from taking a false oath, and must keep
oaths.322 Given the unique role of the Bible and the Quran in their respective
religious traditions, it seems likely that most contemporary statutes could be
applied in such a way as to allow believers to use these artifacts when taking
a witness oath.
Other faith traditions have their own inspired texts and esteemed
artifacts, and thus they could also be used during oath ceremonies consistent
with the same controlling principles of promoting truthful testimony and
binding the conscience of oath takers. For Hindus, swearing on the Bhagavad
Gita323 could enhance oaths. Various Buddhist traditions recognize different
317 See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (demonstrating the absence of
any comprehensive and mandatory oath form); see also United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d
1015, 1018-20 (9th Cir. 1992).
318 FED. R. EviD. 603; United States v. Armijo, 5 F.3d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1993).
319 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
320 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 45, 101-05, 107, 141;
TIMOTHY F. LULL, ON BEING LUTHERAN: REFLECTIONS ON CHURCH, THEOLOGY AND
FAITH 11-15 (2006); NEIL S. WILSON & BRUCE B. BARTON, THE HANDBOOK OF BIBLE
APPLICATION 165 (1992); BILL J. LEONARD, BAPTISTS IN AMERICA 132 (2005).
321 See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
322 See supra Part IV.
323 The Bhagavad Gita is revered as a sacred text of Hindu philosophy. CATHERINE
A. ROBINSON, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BHAGAVAD-GITA AND IMAGES OF THE HINDU
TRADITION: THE SONG OF THE LORD 5 (2006).
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sacred texts. 324 While the list of religions and their corresponding sacred
verses and artifacts is long and complicated,325 many of these would seem to
occupy a similar status to the Bible and the Quran for their respective
believers, and, therefore, could enjoy a similar recognition in American
courtrooms.
C. Using the Bible, Quran, and Other Religious Artifacts to Take an
Oath Is Unnecessary in Modern American Society
Although the underlying principle in both statutory and common law is
to allow forms of oaths which bind the consciences of oath takers and raise
their awareness of the duty to tell the truth, not every oath variation that
serves these purposes must be permitted. It is sufficient that the oath binds
the conscience of the oath taker to tell the truth;326 it is not, however,
necessary that the oath and its accompanying ceremony bind an oath taker's
conscience in the strongest conceivable manner. Thus, the imperative of the
court system to discover and preserve truth and administer justice is met if
the form and manner of the oath or affirmation raises sufficient awareness in
the mind of the oath taker of his truth-telling obligations.
For Christians, an oath is sufficient if it invokes God and thereby raises
the awareness of the oath taker to the presence of a divine witness to his
commitment to tell the truth.327 Although an explicit reference to God is
necessary for an attestation to be considered an oath, the use of the Bible is
not required.328 In fact, the Bible is explicitly permitted in courtroom oath
ceremonies in only a handful of states.329 Most state statutes addressing
courtroom oaths make no reference to sacred artifacts. They instead allow
oath takers to invoke God, make an affirmation that they will tell the truth, or
32 4 See TODD ALBERTSON, THE GODS OF BUSINESS: THE INTERSECTION OF FAITH
AND THE MARKETPLACE 46-47 (2007) (describing the various texts considered sacred by
certain groups of Buddhists, including the Tripitaka and the Dhammapada).
325 See, e.g., id. at 30 (explaining the importance of the Kojiki and the Nihongi in
Shintoism); see also HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD'S GREAT RELIGIONS: OUR GREAT
WISDOM TRADITIONS 76 (1991) (describing the reverence given to the Guru Granth Sahib
in Sikhism).
326 See State v. Healy, 521 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasizing that
the particular form of oath or affirmation used is not important provided that the oath
taker consciously affirms to tell the truth); State v. Sands, 467 A.2d 202, 224 (N.H. 1983)
(recognizing that a form of oath used that causes the oath taker to consciously recognize
the obligation to tell the truth is acceptable even if it is not according to a customary
form).
327 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 45, 2150.
328 Cox v. State, 79 S.E. 909, 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913).
329 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
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permit some other type of accommodation.330 Thus, while it is permissible
and perhaps even desirable in certain instances to allow Christians to use the
Bible in taking an oath, it is not necessary for the purposes of binding a
Christian in conscience to tell the truth in court because of the general moral
requirement that a Christian refrain from lying and giving false testimony. 331
Like Christians, Muslims do not consider swearing on a religious artifact,
including the Quran, to be essential for a valid oath.332 Muslims have a pre-
existing obligation from shariah to speak the truth, making it unnecessary for
Muslim witnesses to use the Quran in oath ceremonies. Indeed, the Quran is
not universally used for oath taking even in predominantly Muslim
countries.333 Swearing an oath with reference to God, without the Quran,
would be fully binding upon a Muslim witness, as would an affirmation to
testify truthfully.334 Either form, with or without the Quran, would be wholly
sufficient to provide the necessary subjective and objective assurances for
oath takers and others.
The same conclusions can be confidently drawn about other faith
traditions and belief systems. The literature discloses no case where a witness
claimed to be disabled from telling the truth because he was denied the use of
an artifact or object during an oath ceremony. Moreover, any person who
expressed such an initial reservation could likely have his concerns alleviated
by appropriate explanations and instructions from the trial judge. For all
these reasons, it is clear that the use of religious artifacts, while permissible
and in some cases even helpful, are not required for meaningful and effective
oaths and affirmations.
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of Allowing Religious Artifacts in
Courtroom Oaths
Given the continued relevancy and power of oaths in modern American
society, and the inessentiality of using religious artifacts in taking oaths, it is
finally necessary to balance the advantages and disadvantages of their use in
courtroom oaths. While there are certain benefits in permitting the use of
330 See supra note 152.
331 Exodus 20:12; CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 45, 2482-
87.
332 HUSSAIN, supra note 195, at 166.
333 See supra note 301.
334 Muslims have on occasion chosen to make an affirmation instead of availing
themselves of the opportunity of swearing on the Quran. See, e.g., United States v.
Kalaydjian, 784 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1986). From the viewpoint of the court, there is no
distinction between an oath or affirmation that commits the witness to testify truthfully.
Hong Sai Chee v. Long Island R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1964).
20091
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
religious artifacts on such occasions, they are outweighed by the
countervailing burdens of such an accommodation.
1. Advantages ofAllowing Religious Artifacts
The first potential advantage of allowing religious artifacts in oath
ceremonies is that they can enhance an oath's substantive effectiveness. As
described earlier, the contemporary justification for a witness oath or
affirmation is to bind the taker's conscience and emphasize his duty to tell
the truth. Although the use of artifacts was never universally treated as
essential for these purposes, they have been employed throughout history
because they are considered beneficial in achieving these ends.335 Thus,
insofar as an artifact has meaning to the oath taker, it can help remind and
encourage him to fulfill his truth-telling duty. Further, because an artifact
may enhance the solemnity of the oath for the taker and observers, it can
strengthen the confidence of the fact-finder and others that a witness has
testified truthfully. The use of religious artifacts, therefore, can help promote
the efficacy of an oath, thereby assisting the search for truth and the
administration of justice.
It would be an overstatement, however, to claim that without religious
artifacts oath takers would neither recognize their duty to tell the truth nor
consider themselves bound in conscience to testify truthfully. When a
witness swears an oath in an American court, he is making a public
expression in a formal ceremony that he will speak the truth regardless of
whether artifacts are used in conjunction with this commitment. The formal
and public expression, alone, has sufficient power to emphasize one's duty
and bind one's conscience. Even if additional ritual is deemed useful, this
can be satisfied by requiring a witness to stand, raise his right hand, and
repeat the oath.
A second possible advantage of permitting witnesses to use religious
artifacts is that such an accommodation is solicitous of diverse and even
individualized religious expression, which is beneficial to society in general
and the legal system in particular. Such permissive procedures would
demonstrate, in an important and tangible way, the public's respect for or at
least tolerance of the full spectrum of religious belief and expression. One
might argue that such an approach is necessary because religious freedom is
truly honored only if no belief is disrespected or unduly encumbered.
Of course, the absolutist position in this regard is silly and, ultimately,
untenable. Expression of all types, including religious expression, has
traditionally been limited within the courtroom context, where certain
335 See supra Part II.
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standards of dignity, decorum, and solemnity must be maintained. 336 Thus,
activities or items which detract from the proper courtroom environment, and
thus hinder the administration of justice, are disallowed or restricted
regardless of their religious content. For example, a reasonable judge would
prohibit a defendant from distractingly praying in the courtroom during the
cross-examination of a witness, or a juror standing and publicly expressing
his belief in Jesus Christ while a prosecuting attorney made an opening
statement. Because the state has legitimate reasons for exercising control in
the courtroom and placing limits on the religious expression of people
present therein, it has the ability to restrict the manner in which oaths can be
sworn. This legitimate authority extends to the use of religious artifacts
during oath ceremonies. Accordingly, the advantages of allowing religious
artifacts in oath ceremonies, while genuine, are minimal and subject to
competing policy considerations.
2. Disadvantages ofAllowing Religious Artifacts
Although there are certain advantages to incorporating religious artifacts
into courtroom oaths, there are substantial, countervailing disadvantages
associated with their use. As one begins down the road of permitting such
objects, he is immediately confronted with two troubling and burdensome
options: (a) accede to an oath taker's request to use any artifact which he
considers symbolic of his religious beliefs, or (b) restrict the use of artifacts
only to those that are deemed acceptable. Either choice leads to a multitude
of undesirable consequences.
Any consideration of the first option must appreciate the enormous
breadth of its logical extension. If no distinctions are to be drawn on
substantive religious bases, then the range of permitted "religious" artifacts
would be virtually unlimited. The only valid criterion for excluding an
336 The notion that there is a certain dignity, decorum, and solemnity that must be
maintained in a court is evidenced by a judge's authority to impose various restrictions
and prohibitions within the courtroom. See, e.g., Jensen v. Superior Court, 201 Cal. Rptr.
275, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that there is a standard for appropriate attire for an
attorney, which is whether it interferes with courtroom decorum disrupting justice, and
the judge has the authority to require attorneys to dress accordingly); Christo Lassiter, An
Annotated Descriptive Summary of State Statutes, Judicial Codes, Canons, and Court
Rules Relating to Admissibility and Governance of Cameras in the Courtroom, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1019, 1025 (1996) (underscoring that certain states allow the
judge to decide whether to permit cameras in the courtroom based in part on whether it
detracts from the solemnity, decorum, and dignity of the court); Gerald G. Ashdown &
Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience of the Guillotine?: Video Proceedings in Federal
Prosecutions, 80 DENY. U. L. REV. 63, 67, 106 (2002) (noting concerns about video
proceedings in federal court in part because "proceedings conducted by video may not
reflect the solemnity and decorum befitting a proceeding in federal court").
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artifact would be on the basis that the reasons offered by an oath taker in
support of its use did not conform to the oath's underlying purposes.
Exclusion would thus turn solely upon the subjective and professed rationale
for the object's use, and not upon the objective nature or legitimacy of the
object itself. Moreover, as affirmation is recognized as an alternative to
oaths, presumably "non-religious" objects should likewise be allowed if an
affirmer contends that they would enhance the efficacy of his affirmation. In
other words, any distinction between religious artifacts and secular objects
would evaporate; courts could be obligated to permit, for example, a
philosophical text or a picture of Elvis for affirmers in the same way they
would allow the Bible or the Quran for oath takers.
Even if courts sought to impose different rules pertaining to artifacts for
oath and affirmation ceremonies, they would still be faced with the dilemma
of what to do about seemingly secular objects. Any attempt to specify a
comprehensive standard for distinguishing between religion and secular
belief systems would be difficult, complex, and fraught with broader
implications.337 For instance, such an approach could require a court to
337 Attempts to determine what does and does not constitute a religion have been
marked with contradictions and varying standards. For an overview of these varying
standards and approaches, see Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to
Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other
Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and
Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REv. 123 (2007). Courts have sometimes concluded that no
attempt should be made to distinguish between religious belief and secular belief. See,
e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("It is no business of courts to say
that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion .. "); State ex
rel. Tate v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555, 562 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965) ("this court cannot--or
should not-undertake to define or rule on what is or what is not a religion"). The
Internal Revenue Service likewise observed that:
It is logically impossible to define 'religion'. It appears that the two religious clauses
of the First Amendment define' religious freedom' but do not establish a definition of
'religion' within recognized parameters. An attempt to define religion, even for
purposes of statutory construction, violates the 'establishment' clause since it
necessarily delineates and, therefore, limits what can and cannot be a religion. The
judicial system has struggled with this philosophic problem throughout the years in a
variety of contexts.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,993 (Feb. 3, 1977). See id., however, for a historical treatment
of attempts to determine what constituted a "church" for tax exempt purposes.
Even the purposeful adoption of broad definitions for religion, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
290kk(c)(6) (2000) (tautologically defining the term "religious organization" to mean a
"nonprofit religious organization"), results in discord as to the meaning of words and
whether other understandings are needed by the government in order to avoid religious
entanglement. See also 42 C.F.R. § 54.2 (2003) (declining to adopt the tax code's more
focused definition of "religious organization" or otherwise narrow its definition when
implementing a new federal program to which funds will be given to religious
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determine whether Scientology qualifies as a religion. 338 If it does, its
artifacts may be used during oath ceremonies; if it does not, they cannot be
used. What about New Age spirituality and secular humanism, or for that
matter Satanism and witchcraft? The list seems inexhaustible. Indeed, if the
definition of a "religion" does not include a requirement for a community of
believers or a demonstrable historical basis, then any witness would be free
to mint his own personal religion before testifying and insist upon using its
unique and individually specified artifacts.339
Such a prospect is intolerable. Unusual or elaborate forms of oaths, and
controversial and offensive artifacts, would be distracting or worse. They
could undermine the solemnity and decorum that is necessary and expected
in courts of law. 340 They could unduly detract from the credibility of a
organizations for certain purposes). In implementing his faith-based initiative, President
George W. Bush instituted more detailed guidance about what an organization is
permitted to do with government funds: a faith-based organization "may retain its
independence and may continue to carry out its mission, including the definition,
development, practice, and expression of its religious beliefs, provided that it does not
use direct Federal financial assistance to support any inherently religious activities, such
as worship, religious instruction, or proselytization[J" it may use its facility "without
removing or altering religious art, icons, scriptures, or other symbols from these
facilities[;]" and it may "select its board members on a religious basis, and include
religious references in its organization's mission statements and other chartering or
governing documents." Exec. Order No. 13,279, 3 C.F.R. § 2(f) (2002) (Executive Order:
Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations).
Predictably, these restrictions have led to a multitude of debates and lawsuits. See, e.g.,
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). The Supreme Court's
own ambivalence as to what constitutes "secular" and "religious" has likely only added to
the confusion surrounding religion in the public square, which in turn gives rise to
lawsuits litigating the issues. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825-29 (2000)
(plurality opinion) & 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (demonstrating that the Court's
"pervasively sectarian" doctrine-guiding how federal aid may be given to religious
organizations without triggering a First Amendment violation-no longer enjoys majority
approval on the Court).
338 Courts have answered the question in contradictory ways. Compare Mo. Church
of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Mo. 1977) (disqualifying
Scientology for a state tax exemption using a "Supreme Being" test), with Founding
Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (indicating that Scientology is a religion). See generally L. RON HUBBARD,
WHAT IS SCiENTOLOGY? (1998) (providing a comprehensive overview of the
organization, practices, and philosophy of Scientology). For a further discussion on
whether Scientology should be considered a religion, see BRYAN R. WILSON, THE SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS OF SECTARIANISM: SECTS AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 267-70 (1992).
339 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing how such a permissive
approach to artifacts proved unacceptable in ancient Greece and likely led to
standardization and restrictions upon their use).
340 See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
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witness based on an expression of his religious beliefs when taking his
oath.341 And, they could offend many more people, including the parties at
trial and the public generally, than would be offended if all artifacts were
categorically prohibited. 342 Depending on the artifact used, the integrity and
effectiveness of the justice system could be seriously compromised, thereby
defeating the very purpose that oaths and affirmations were intended to
serve.
Reasonable restrictions on oath forms and ceremonies, and the artifacts
used with and in them, have long been permitted. For example, decisory
oaths are disallowed in American courtrooms, regardless of whether the
particular religious traditions of individuals involved recognize their use in
resolving conflict. 343 Another imposition of proper limitations involves so-
called loyalty oaths;344 although the government may require such oaths in
certain instances, the Supreme Court has instructed that some forms of
loyalty oaths are legally objectionable.345 These and other examples illustrate
that the substance and procedures for oaths may be circumscribed and
specified for legitimate reasons. In the courtroom context, such restrictions
have traditionally been imposed to regulate the reception of substantive
evidence and control courtroom practices. Consistent with these limitations,
341 One can only imagine the negative judgments that jurors might make about the
credibility of witnesses who are self-proclaimed Satanists and witches or perhaps,
regrettably, even Muslims in contemporary times. See FED. R. EVID. 610 (providing that
"[e]vidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible
for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is
impaired or enhanced").
342 Depending on the artifact used, disapproval or offense could blossom into
outrage, such as if a neo-Nazi swore an oath on a copy of Mein Kampf or adherents of the
vampire religion swore on the Vampire Bible. For information concerning the Vampire
Bible and the vampire religion, see Temple of the Vampire,
http://www.vampiretemple.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
343 Decisory oaths were prohibited in American secular courts even while a form of
such oath, a supplementary oath, was simultaneously recognized in Canon Law tribunals
in America and elsewhere. See THE 1917 OR PIO-BENEDICTINE CODE OF CANON LAW,
Canon 1829, at 598 (Edward N. Peters, trans., Ignatius Press 2001) ("If there is available
only semi-full proof and there is no other additional proof available, the judge can order
or admit an oath to supplement the evidence, the other being called supplementary.").
344 A loyalty oath is an oath that the government may require individuals to take in
certain circumstances (including prospective employment) to affirm "that they are not
engaged in, or do not advocate sedition, subversive activities, or treason." 70 AM. JUR. 2D
Sedition, Etc., § 1 (2008).
345 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190 (1952) (striking down loyalty oaths
that failed to distinguish between knowing and innocent membership in certain
proscribed organizations and therefore could not be imposed upon prospective
employees).
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rule makers could claim the authority to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable oath-related artifacts, and prescribe their use on that basis.
There are, however, considerable disadvantages associated with
establishing rules for culling which artifacts are permitted for courtroom
oaths. If some artifacts are allowed while others are excluded, this would
necessitate the recognition and application of criteria for drawing such
distinctions. These criteria necessarily would involve a substantive and
normative evaluation about the legitimacy, or at a minimum the
acceptability, of various religions and their artifacts. This implicates
judgments about the genuineness and worthiness of faith traditions and their
beliefs. Such decisions would involve imponderables and could be highly
offensive. Further, there is no moral consensus for making such judgments.
And, even if such a consensus existed, difficult questions would remain
about the moral legitimacy, let alone its constitutionality, of acting upon such
a consensus for these purposes.
There are also practical difficulties with such an approach. Neither
legislators nor courts have any special competence in rendering judgments
about the legitimacy of religions and religious beliefs. 346 Even if they did, it
is doubtful that most people would entrust such decisions to these authorities.
Moreover, the types of decisions encompassed by the wide-ranging
undertaking of permitting and rejecting artifacts would be both
breathtakingly sweeping and devilishly detailed. On some occasions, secular
authorities would be called upon to make broad pronouncements about
whether a belief system qualifies as a religion, and, if it does, whether it is a
religion whose artifacts deserve special recognition in oath ceremonies. At
other times, they would be asked to referee complicated internecine disputes,
such as whether Catholics can select the Bible, a relic, or the Eucharistic to
use when taking an oath, or to decide which version of the Bible is permitted
for which Christian denominations. At the outer edges, such judgments could
involve choosing sides about theological questions that have not even been
fully settled within a particular religious tradition. To ensnare secular
lawmakers or judges in these confounding matters would be more than
wasteful: it could be highly inappropriate, disrespectful, and even
sacrilegious.
346 Indeed, courts are generally quite circumspect when reviewing religious ideas
and practices. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("[Ilt is no business of
courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion...");
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976); Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969) ("First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation
is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine
and practice.").
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3. The Solution: An Invocation of God Without the Use ofArtifacts
The most serious problems relating to religious endorsement can be
avoided by allowing an explicit reference to an undifferentiated God while
prohibiting the use of any artifacts. Such a public, generic reference to the
divine would not intrude upon private conceptions of God, which can remain
infinitely personal to the oath taker. Christians can comfortably swear an
oath to God as God. So can Muslims. 347 So too, presumably, can adherents
of most monotheistic religious traditions. If the witness cannot swear to God
in this manner, or swear at all, or does not believe in any form of divinity, he
can instead affirm.
Retaining the explicit reference to an undifferentiated God as part of an
oath allows the legal system to preserve a venerable and still meaningful
custom while adapting to the realities of today's religiously diverse
American culture. Such an approach recognizes the possibility of a
supernatural connection between the oath taker and his divine maker. It
facilitates the expression of this most important spiritual relationship, for
legitimate secular reasons, while simultaneously respecting all manner of
subjective understandings of God and avoiding sectarian limitations.
Eliminating the use of artifacts, including the Bible, from oath
ceremonies removes a legitimate but superfluous-and perhaps ultimately
malignant-appendage to the substance of a witness oath while preserving its
vitality in changing times. It allows more witnesses to take an oath to God
rather than be forced instead to affirm because of objections to the Bible. It
likewise avoids the problems associated with making the Bible optional,
including the need to differentiate between Christian and non-Christian oath
takers for controversial reasons that could raise First Amendment objections
and cause sectarian-based offense. It is submitted that the approach proposed
in this Article is the best, imperfect solution to a complicated and multi-
faceted problem.348
VI. CONCLUSION
Human nature seeks to know the truth. Yet in American society, as in all
cultures, the virtue of truthfulness is not fully inculcated. Given this reality,
oaths and affirmations remain relevant and necessary. The venerable
common law and statutory principles still resonating within our legal system
347 See supra note 176 (explaining that Muslims can and do refer to "God" and
"Allah" interchangeably).
348 Although constitutional questions are beyond the scope of this Article, it
likewise seems, at least preliminarily, that such an approach would be acceptable under
the First Amendment.
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are aimed at maximizing who can testify as a witness and otherwise
participate in the legal process. This goal is best served by an oath or
affirmation that at once binds the conscience of an oath taker and is free from
unnecessary embellishments that may unduly limit who can swear an oath.
Consistent with these goals, and given the longstanding religious character of
American society and its growing diversity of religious beliefs, it is prudent
to allow a divine invocation that avoids sectarian divisiveness.
Although religious artifacts, such as the Bible and the Quran, have long
and often been used in oath taking, they are not essential to the validity or
efficacy of oaths. And, while such artifacts may be acceptable within a
courtroom environment, either permitting their wholesale use or attempting
to distinguish between them based on their spiritual merits is problematic and
unwise for a variety of important reasons, both abstract and practical. In the
end, all of the benefits of oaths can be realized and their burdens avoided by
an oath form that includes a public commitment by the affiant to testify
truthfully, before God and the community, without sectarian identification or
additional religious accouterments.
The purpose and content of oaths and oath ceremonies need to be
fundamentally re-examined and re-considered. ACLU of North Carolina and
Congressman Ellison are harbingers of the impact of growing religious
diversity and an accompanying sense of equality and entitlement regarding
religious expression in civic affairs. 349 The proposals regarding oaths made
here, in conjunction with the option of affirmation, will help ensure that we
remain one nation, mostly under God, but in any case one nation.
349 See, e.g., Dana Canedy, Lifting Veil for Photo ID Goes Too Far, Driver Says,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 2002, at A16 (reporting on a Muslim woman who claims the state is
violating her religious rights in demanding she remove her veil for a drivers license
photo); Alan Cooperman, For Gods and Country, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2007, at Cl
(reporting on an application to be the first Wiccan chaplain in the Army).
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